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THE NEW MISSOURI EMPLOYER IMMUNITY STATUTE: ARE 
MISSOURI EMPLOYERS STILL DAMNED IF THEY DO AND 
DAMNED IF THEY DON’T? 
“I have noticed,” Calvin Coolidge used to say, “that nothing that I never said 
ever did me any harm.”  In the field of employment law, Calvin Coolidge has a 
lot of disciples, especially when it comes to job references.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION—THE NEED FOR A NEW LAW 
It has long been the practice of employment lawyers in Missouri to caution 
their clients to give only “name, rank, and serial number” when asked to 
respond to reference requests.2  This advice stems from the Hobson’s choice 
created for employers who fear that including too much information in a 
reference will subject them to a suit for defamation or retaliatory discharge, 
while including too little information will expose them to suits for 
misrepresentation.3 
Even as they shy away from divulging information about current or former 
employees, Missouri employers are presumably following the national trend to 
aggressively seek references when hiring new employees.4  At the same time, 
 
 1. Jack Kenny, Beware Giving References for Ex-Employees, 9 N.H. BUS. REV. 1, Feb. 14, 
1997. 
 2. See New Missouri Reference Request Law—For What It’s Worth, 9 MO. EMP. L. LETTER 
1 (Armstrong Teasdale LLP, St. Louis, Mo.), June 1999, at 1.  This practice is certainly not 
unique to Missouri employment attorneys.  See, e.g., Kenny, supra note 1 (quoting a local 
employment attorney, “My advice is that the employer should confirm the dates of employment, 
the nature of the position and that’s it.”). 
 3. See Jonathon Vegosen, Employment Law: Figuring Out Whether to Tell All or Zip Your 
Lip on References, 19 CHI. LAW. 15, Sept. 1996 (“Employers providing information to 
prospective employers frequently have found themselves the target of defamation suits.  As a 
result, many employers have adopted a ‘name, rank and serial number’ approach.”). See also 
Robert S. Adler & Ellen R. Pierce, Encouraging Employers to Abandon Their “No Comment” 
Policies Regarding Job References: A Proposal for Reform, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1381, 
1415-19 (1996) (discussing misrepresentation in the employment context); Susan Oliver, 
Opening the Channels of Communication Among Employers: Can Employers Discard Their “No 
Comment” and Neutral Job Reference Policies?, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 687, 689 (1999) (same); 
infra notes 55-179 and accompanying text (discussing reference-based claims). 
 4. See SOCIETY OF HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, JOB CANDIDATES AREN’T AFRAID 
TO FIB (Press Release) (1998) (visited Feb. 20, 2000) <http://www.shrm.org/press/ 
releases/980130.html> (explaining that of the 854 human resource professionals who responded 
to a reference checking survey conducted in July 1998, 89 percent check references for 
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and in response to the increasing problem of workplace violence, courts are 
beginning to hold employers responsible for the safety of their employees and 
third parties.5  During the 1990s, approximately one million workers became 
victims of assault in the workplace each year.6  In the same decade, there were 
an average of twenty workplace homicides every week.7  Consequently, an 
employer’s ability to obtain complete and accurate references is becoming 
more important than ever.8 
Applicants may be more likely to falsify information about their work 
history or criminal past if they know that employers are reluctant to release 
information about job performance.9  Once employees realize that their 
detailed work history does not follow them from job to job, they may have less 
 
professional positions, 85 percent for administrative positions and 81 percent for technical 
positions).  See also Peter Dalpe, Job References Can Be Elusive, NEW HAVEN REG., Aug. 29, 
1995, at D1 (reference checking has increased ten-fold since a 1979 scandal involving a 
Washington Post reporter who faked her credentials); Kenny, supra note 1 (“[S]ome personnel 
officials who follow non-disclosure policies say they, too, would like more information about job 
applicants at their firms. ‘It’s frustrating,’ admitted [one human resource manager].  ‘I guess I’m 
expecting people to give me information I won’t give anybody else.’”). 
 5. See William C. Martucci & Denise Drake Clemow, Workplace Violence: Incidents and 
Liability on the Rise, EMP. REL. TODAY, Dec. 22, 1994, at 463.  Note also that the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals recently held that a plaintiff who was awarded compensatory damages as a 
result of sexual harassment by her supervisor might also be entitled to punitive damages because 
her employer was “unmistakably aware” of the harasser’s previous behavior.  Knowlton v. 
Teltrust Phones, Inc., 189 F.3d 1177, 1187 (10th Cir. 1999).  The employer was aware of the 
harasser’s propensities because he had already been accused of pinning another female employee 
against a wall and making sexual advances.  See id. at 1186-87.  The company first fired the 
harasser, but then rehired him at a sister company, gave him a larger office and an $8,000 raise.  
See id.  The Knowlton court cited the Supreme Court’s recent articulation of the standard for 
punitive damages liability in sexual harassment cases, Kolstad v. American Dental Ass’n, 119 S. 
Ct. 2118, 2120-23 (1999), as a basis for overturning the district court’s decision to grant the 
employer’s motion for directed verdict on the issue of punitive damages.  Knowlton, 189 F.3d at 
1186.  See also 164 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), Aug. 25, 1999, at A-2 (discussing Knowlton). 
 6. See DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NIOSH REPORT ADDRESSES PROBLEM 
OF WORKPLACE VIOLENCE, SUGGESTS STRATEGIES FOR PREVENTING RISKS (1996) (Press 
Release) (last modified July 18, 1996) <http://www.cdc.niosh/violpr.html>. 
 7. See id. 
 8. See Oliver, supra note 3, at 735.  See also Vegosen, supra note 3 (“[T]his ‘neutral 
reference’ strategy can backfire.  For example, inquiring companies have sued employers for 
providing a ‘negligent reference’ when employers have failed to disclose that former employees 
committed violent acts in the course of their employment.”).  See also infra notes 150-79 and 
accompanying text (discussing negligent misrepresentation/referral). 
 9. See SOCIETY FOR HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, supra note 4 (indicating that 
almost half of the human resource departments surveyed said they knew a candidate who falsified 
information about a criminal past); Rob Hotakainen, Pannier Case Calls Scrutiny of Teachers 
Into Question, STAR-TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), July 27, 1999, at 1A (explaining how a 
teacher falsified his college transcript to gain a teaching job and is now standing trial for having 
sex with a 15-year-old student). 
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incentive to refrain from unacceptable behavior in the workplace.10  
Additionally, the lack of available information regarding an employee’s 
performance may lead some to assume a cavalier attitude toward their work.11  
Yet, the reluctance of employers to give a detailed reference persists.12 
Employers are aware of the need for information about an applicant, not 
only to avoid potential liability resulting from hiring a violent employee, but 
also to hire someone who is qualified to do the job.13  When information about 
an applicant is unavailable prospective employers may turn to less reliable 
sources, such as physical and psychological profiles, drug tests, or a 
prospective employee’s credit history.14  These avenues for seeking 
information may have little value as a predictor of an employee’s performance 
and may raise employee privacy concerns.15 
Thus, employers are not the only ones harmed by “no comment” or neutral 
job reference policies.16  An employer’s refusal to give information when 
asked for a reference can inhibit the job search for applicants with outstanding 
 
 10. See id. at 1429.  See also Julie Forster, 25 States Adopt ‘Good Faith’ Job Reference 
Laws to Shield Businesses from Liability, WEST’S LEGAL NEWS , July 2, 1996, available in 1996 
WL 363324 (quoting South Carolina’s state director for the National Federation of Independent 
Businesses, “The silence . . . quite honestly [helps] the bad employee because that person [knows] 
he [can] go from job to job and [his] employers [won’t] say[] anything bad about [him].”); 
Hotakainen, supra note 9 (relating the story of a teacher about to stand trial for having sex with a 
15-year-old student after the teacher moved from job to job undeterred by prior misconduct in 
other school districts). 
 11. See Adler & Pierce, supra note 3, at 1429. 
 12. See New Missouri Reference Request Law, supra note 2, at 2.  See also Julie M. 
Buchanan, Threat of Defamation Lawsuits Limits Employee Information, MILWAUKEE J. & 
SENTINEL, July 22, 1999, at 15 (“All you can get these days is name, rank and serial number.  In 
other words, you get dates of hire, but no information pertaining to job performances, misconduct 
or attendance.  You can’t even find out whether the individual quit or was fired.”); Judi Russell, 
Law Backs Employer Candor in Job Reference, NEW ORLEANS CITY BUS., July 22, 1996, at 6 
(“Job references, once the jewel in a résumé’s crown, have become about as useless to employers 
as manual typewriters.  Fearful of lawsuits . . . supervisors often limit their replies to a few terse 
facts when asked about a current or former staff member.”). 
 13. See Oliver, supra note 3, at 692.  See also Vegosen, supra note 3 (“This practice [of 
providing neutral job references] inhibits the ability of prospective employers to obtain important 
information about a potential employee’s competence.”). 
 14. See Adler & Pierce, supra note 3, at 1428-29.  See also Buchanan, supra note 12 (“The 
lack of reliable information on a prospective employee . . . results in an undue emphasis being 
placed on job interviews, which often are less objective types of candidate assessment.”). 
 15. See Adler & Pierce, supra note 3, at 1429.  See generally Rochelle B. Esker, To Catch A 
Thief: The Private Employer’s Guide to Getting and Keeping an Honest Employee, 63 UMKC. L. 
REV. 251 (1994) (addressing employee privacy in the job reference context). 
 16. See Mike Maharray, Legislature 1997: Bill Allows More Leeway in Job References, 
NEWS TRIB. (Tacoma, Wa.), Mar. 1, 1997, at B4 (quoting the owner of a local employment 
agency, regarding employers’ nondisclosure policies, “This hurts employers and it hurts the good 
employee who has earned a good reference.”). 
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credentials.17  These exceptional employees are effectively prevented from 
showing prospective employers their superior records when seeking to advance 
their careers.18  Employers are less likely to hire an applicant for whom they 
are unable to obtain information than they are to hire an applicant with a good 
reference.19 
Perhaps more troubling, the dearth of reference information has led some 
employers to bypass restrictions established by a company’s human resource 
department and seek information directly from an employee’s supervisor or co-
workers.20  This approach may do little to insulate an employer from liability, 
while, in some cases, it may subject employees to a biased review from the one 
person in the workplace with whom they have a personality conflict.21 
Moreover, in an effort to undermine restrictive reference practices, some 
employers are engaging in a “wink and nod” approach.22  Under this approach, 
employers attempt to convey their feelings about an employee by saying 
something like “John was terrific, we hated to lose him, however, our official 
policy is to say this and this.”23  Other employers may try to get their message 
across by providing a neutral reference such as “yes, the person worked here” 
in a resigned tone.24  These approaches are subject to misinterpretation by a 
prospective employer; for example, a message that an employee requires closer 
scrutiny may go undetected, while a highly muted message that an employee is 
worthy of praise may be read as disapproval.25 
 
 17. See id.  See also Adler & Pierce, supra note 3, at 1429 n.245 (quoting Paul W. Barada, 
Check References With Care, NATION’S BUS., May 1993, at 54) (“Nothing puts up a red flag in 
the mind of the prospective employer quicker than a reference who is unwilling to talk about a 
former employee.  If a former employer refuses to comment, the caller may assume it’s because 
something is wrong with the applicant.”). 
 18. See Adler & Pierce, supra note 3, at 1428-29. See also Forster, supra note 11 (quoting 
South Carolina’s state director for the National Federation of Independent Businesses, “The 
silence also hurts good employers [sic] because they aren’t getting the quality recommendation 
that they worked hard to get.”); Kenny, supra note 1 (quoting a local human resource manager, 
“We don’t even give out good references, just to be consistent.  At this point we’re all playing the 
game of ‘don’t say anything, even if you want to.’”). 
 19. See Bradley Saxton, Flaws in the Laws Governing Employment References: Problems of 
“Overdetterence” and a Proposal for Reform, 13 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 45, 50 (1995) (citing a 
1992 survey conducted by Paul Half International, Inc., an executive search firm, indicating that 
forty-four percent of responding executives view a former employer’s no comment regarding a 
former employee’s work record as a detriment to the applicant’s chances of being hired). 
 20. See Adler & Pierce, supra note 3, at 1429-30. 
 21. See Vicky Uhland, Escaping a Bad-Mouth Boss: How Do You Get a Decent Reference 
from an Enemy?, DENVER ROCKY MTN. NEWS, June 20, 1999, at 1J. 
 22. Adler & Pierce, supra note 3, at 1430. 
 23. Id. at 1430 n.252 (quoting Brooklyn-based employment attorney Jose Rivera). 
 24. Id.  See also Uhland, supra note 21 (quoting a Littleton, Colorado employment lawyer, 
“[M]uch can be implied by tone or inference.”). 
 25. See Adler & Pierce, supra note 3, at 1430. 
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In an effort to encourage employers to abandon their “no comment” and 
neutral job reference policies, during its 1999 legislative session, the Missouri 
General Assembly passed a law that attempts to balance the competing 
interests of workers who need protection against arbitrary references, and 
employers who need to make informed hiring decisions.26  The measure was 
signed into law by Governor Mel Carnahan on July 13, 1999, as part of a bill 
designed to make changes in the state’s unemployment compensation system.27  
The new statute will be codified at section 290.152 of the Missouri Revised 
Statutes.28 
 
 26. See New Missouri Reference Request Law, supra note 2, at 1. 
 27. See id. 
 28. At the time this Comment went to press, the new statute was not yet available in the 
bound volume of the Missouri Revised Statutes or its supplement.  Accordingly, throughout this 
Comment, the new statute will be cited to Vernon’s Annotated Missouri Statutes.  See MO. ANN. 
STAT. § 290.152 (West Supp. 2000): 
1. As used in this section, the following terms shall mean: 
(1) “Employer,” any individual, organization, partnership, political subdivision, 
corporation or other legal entity which has or had in the entity’s employ one or more 
individuals performing services for the entity within this state; 
(2) “Prospective employer,” any employer, as defined in this subsection, to which an 
individual has made application for employment, either oral or written, or forwarded a 
resume or other correspondence expressing an interest in employment. 
2. An employer may: 
(1) Respond in writing to a written request concerning a current or former employee 
from an entity or person which the employer reasonably believes to be a prospective 
employer of such employee; and 
(2) Disclose the nature and character of service rendered by such employee to such 
employer and the duration thereof; and 
(3) Truly state for what cause, if any, such employee was discharged or voluntarily 
quit such service. 
The provisions of this section shall apply regardless of whether the employee becomes 
employed by the prospective employer prior to receipt of the former employer’s written 
response.  The information provided pursuant to this section shall be consistent with the 
content of any service letter provided pursuant to section 290.140 for the same employee. 
3. The employer shall send a copy of any letter provided pursuant to subsection 2 of this 
section to the current employee or former employee at the employee’s last known address.  
The current or former employee may request from the employer a copy of the letter 
provided pursuant to subsection 2 of this section for up to one year following the date of 
such letter. 
4. For purposes of this section, an employer shall be immune from civil liability for any 
response made pursuant to this section or for any consequences of such response, unless 
such response was false and made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless 
disregard for whether such response was true or false. 
5. Any employer who violates the provisions of subsection 2 of this section shall be liable 
for compensatory damages but not punitive damages. 
6. Any letter issued pursuant to this section shall not be admitted as evidence in an 
unemployment compensation claim. 
Id. 
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The statute gives an employer who voluntarily responds to a request for a 
reference from a prospective employer “immun[ity] from civil liability,” unless 
the response was “false and made with knowledge that it was false or with 
reckless disregard for whether such response was true or false.”29  Employers 
who choose to respond pursuant to the statute’s dictates are also protected from 
an award of punitive damages if they “[d]isclose the nature and character of 
service rendered by such employee and the duration thereof; and . . . [t]ruly 
state for what cause, if any, such employee was discharged or voluntarily quit 
such service.”30  The statute requires that a copy of any response be mailed to 
the current or former employee at the employee’s last known address.31  The 
statute also allows an affected employee to request a copy of any response 
made pursuant to the statute.32 
According to law’s primary sponsor, Missouri State Representative Vicky 
Riback Wilson, the new reference immunity statute represents a compromise 
between the interests of employers and employees and serves a variety of 
important purposes.33  First, the statute limits employers’ civil liability for 
information provided in a reference.34  This protection encourages the free-
flow of information between employers, allowing them to make informed 
hiring decisions.35  Better-informed hiring decisions in turn may permit 
employers to weed out dangerous employees and to protect the general public 
as well as those in the workplace.36  The statute also protects employees by 
attempting to assure that they are provided with the same information as their 
prospective employers and that the information is job-related.37 
 
 29. Id. § 290.152.2, -.4. 
 30. Id. § 290.152.2. 
 31. Id. § 290.152.3. 
 32. See id. § 290.152.3. 
 33. See H.R. 441, 90th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1999), available in 1999 MO H.B. 441 
(Westlaw, MO-BILLS database) [hereinafter H.B. 441 of 1/18/99].  Missouri State 
Representative Vicky Riback Wilson, Democrat, 25th Dist., was the primary sponsor of the bill, 
which was also sponsored by Representative Carol Jean Mays, Democrat, 50th Dist.  See id.  The 
bill was co-sponsored by Representatives Marsha Campbell, Democrat, 39th Dist.; Tim Van 
Zandt, Democrat, 38th Dist.; Scott Lakin, Democrat, 33rd Dist.; and Emmy L. McClelland, 
Republican, 91st Dist.  See id.  It was this bill that underwent major changes during the 1999 
legislative session and was eventually incorporated, in total, into Senate Bill 32.  S. 32, 90th Leg., 
1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1999) (enacted) (to be codified at MO. REV. STAT. § 290.152).  See also 
interviews with Missouri State Representative Vicky Riback Wilson (Oct. 25, 1999 & Feb. 23, 
2000) [hereinafter Riback Wilson interviews] (notes on file with author). 
 34. See Riback Wilson interviews, supra note 33. 
 35. See id. 
 36. See id.  According to one of the bill’s sponsors, Representative Riback Wilson, the 
Missouri home health care industry was one of the most active participants in lobbying for 
passage of the bill.  See id. 
 37. See id. 
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Still, statutory immunity may help vindictive employers escape liability 
resulting from defamatory references by placing a hurdle in the path of 
employees seeking to challenge such references.38  On the other hand, failing 
to protect employers who provide references in good faith makes it easier for 
incompetent or dangerous employees to move from job to job.39  The new 
Missouri reference immunity statute, or “shield law,”40 attempts to encourage 
the voluntary exchange of reference information, but does not decrease the 
chances that reasonable and defensible reference practices will be challenged 
in court.41 
Accordingly, even before the new statute became effective, attorneys for 
Missouri employers were advising their clients not to “substantially depart” 
from the “‘name, rank, and serial number’ mentality.”42  This Comment 
explores the reasons why Missouri employers are likely to retain their current 
practices and suggests ways in which the new statute might be clarified to 
create additional incentives for employers to abandon their “no comment” and 
neutral job reference policies.43 
 
 38. See Adler & Pierce, supra note 3, at 1432.  Under the new statute, if an employer is 
found to have abused the qualified statutory immunity, an employee is purportedly limited to an 
award of compensatory damages.  See MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.5.  This limits an employee’s 
common law defamation remedies, which include eligibility for an award of punitive damages 
when the common law qualified privilege for references is overcome.  See infra notes 108-19 and 
accompanying text (discussing the common law qualified privilege that attaches to employment 
reference in Missouri). 
 39. See Adler & Pierce, supra note 3, at 1432. 
 40. Some commentators refer to reference immunity statutes as “shield laws” because they 
are intended to “shield” an employer from liability for providing reference information.  See, e.g., 
Adler & Pierce, supra note 3, at 1388. 
 41. See New Missouri Reference Request Law, supra note 2, at 2 (stating that the new law 
“does not limit the currently available claims that can be made against an employer” in Missouri).  
See also Uhland, supra note 21 (quoting Sandra Goldman, an attorney with Holland & Hart LLP, 
explaining that immunity from civil liability is not the equivalent of immunity from suit). 
 42. See New Missouri Reference Request Law, supra note 2, at 2. 
 43. Professor Bradley Saxton, who has written extensively on the subject of employment 
references, believes the five most significant factors influencing employers to adopt restrictive 
reference policies are: 
(1) the fact that the most tangible benefits of open reference practices are realized by the 
recipients, rather than the providers of reference information; (2) the fact that the expected 
costs of open reference policies have typically been borne almost exclusively by the 
providers of reference information; (3) the significant inconsistencies in the rules 
potentially determining employers’ liability for employment references; (4) the absence of 
a legal duty on the part of employers to respond to reference inquiries; and (5) the 
‘American Rule’ requirement that even employers whose reference practices are 
reasonable and responsible will pay significant attorney’s fees if forced to defend those 
practices. 
Saxton, supra note 19, at 113. 
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One reason employers may be reluctant to rely on the new statute to 
protect them from reference-based liability is because statutory immunity from 
civil liability is not the same thing as immunity from suit.44  To illustrate the 
extent of liability Missouri employers face, Part II of this Comment examines 
some of the causes of action employees may utilize in challenging a 
reference.45  Additionally, Missouri courts will likely look to the law that has 
developed pursuant to these causes of action when construing the new statute. 
Another reason Missouri employers may be hesitant to rely on the new 
statute to protect them from reference-based claims is because a perception 
exists that the law affords no more protection than employers already had 
under the common law.46  Part III of this Comment examines the language, 
scope, and possible implications of the new law to determine exactly what the 
statute does and does not do.47  Part III also provides proposals for reforming 
the statute to encourage employers to rely on the law to protect them from 
liability when attempting, in good faith, to comply with the statute’s dictates.48 
Part IV suggests that the new Missouri statute does not go far enough in 
encouraging employers to provide detailed information when responding to 
reference requests.49  This section includes a proposed statute that would place 
a duty on employers to provide certain information in response to a proper 
request for a reference.50  Even further, the proposed statute would place a 
strictly limited, but affirmative “duty to warn” on a current or former employer 
who provides a reference.51  This limited “duty to warn” would require a 
former or current employer to inform a prospective employer if an employee 
 
 44. See New Missouri Reference Request Law, supra note 1, at 2; supra note 41. 
 45. See infra notes 55-179 and accompanying text (discussing causes of action commonly 
brought to challenge an employment reference in Missouri, negligent hiring, and the emerging 
cause of action or negligent misrepresentation or referral).  Note that an allegedly defamatory 
reference may also form the basis of a claim for intentional interference with prospective 
economic advantage.  See, e.g., Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 316 (Mo. 
1993) (en banc).  Under Missouri law this tort requires proof of: 
(1) contract or valid business expectancy; (2) defendant’s knowledge of the contract or 
relationship; (3) a breach induced or caused by defendant’s intentional interference; (4) 
absence of justification; and (5) damages. 
Id. at 316 (citing Community Title v. Roosevelt Fed. Sav. & Loan, 796 S.W.2d 369, 372 (Mo. 
1990) (en banc)).  See also Adler & Pierce, supra note 3, at 1412-14 (discussing the tort of 
intentional interference with prospective economic advantage in the employment reference 
context); Saxton, supra note 19, at 64-65 (same). 
 46. See New Missouri Reference Request Law, supra note 2, at 2 (“Although the [new 
statute] adopts a qualified privilege for employers, the courts had already done that, so it does not 
actually create any new protections.”). 
 47. See infra notes 180-246 and accompanying text. 
 48. See id. 
 49. See infra notes 247-313 and accompanying text. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
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has engaged in certain harmful or violent conduct in the workplace.52  As an 
additional limitation, the duty to include admonitory information in a reference 
would only arise if the employee was being considered for a position in which 
he or she would pose a substantial risk of harm to third parties.53  Finally, the 
proposal suggests that courts, in their discretion, be allowed to award 
attorneys’ fees and costs to a prevailing party in any litigation brought pursuant 
to the statute.54 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF SELECTED REFERENCE-BASED CLAIMS 
A. Claims Brought by the Current or Former Employee 
1. The Missouri Service Letter Statute 
Under the Missouri Service Letter Statute, certain corporate employees are 
granted the right to request, and the employer is required to issue, a service 
letter describing the nature, character and length of service rendered by the 
employee, including the reason the employee was discharged or voluntarily left 
employment.55  In sharp contrast, Missouri’s new reference immunity statute 
extends immunity to references given only in response to a written request 
from a “prospective employer,” and the employer’s response is completely 
voluntary.56 
 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See supra notes 247-313 and accompanying text. 
 55. The Missouri Service Letter Statute currently provides: 
1. Whenever any employee of any corporation doing business in this state and which 
employs seven or more employees, who shall have been in the service of said corporation 
for a period of at least ninety days, shall be discharged or voluntarily quit the service of 
such corporation and who thereafter within a reasonable period of time, but not later than 
one year following the date the employee was discharged or voluntarily quit, requests in 
writing by certified mail to the superintendent, manager or registered agent of said 
corporation, with specific reference to the statute, it shall be the duty of the superintendent 
or manager of said corporation to issue to such employee, within forty-five days after the 
receipt of such request, a letter, duly signed by such superintendent or manager, setting 
forth the nature and character of service rendered by such employee to such corporation 
and the duration thereof, and truly stating for what cause, if any, such employee was 
discharged or voluntarily quit such service. 
2. Any corporation which violates the provisions of subsection 1 of this section shall be 
liable for compensatory but not punitive damages but in the event that the evidence 
establishes that the employer did not issue the requested letter, said employer may be 
liable for nominal and punitive damages; but no award of punitive damages under this 
section shall be based upon the content of any such letter. 
MO. REV. STAT. § 290.140 (1994). 
 56. Compare MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.2, with MO. REV. STAT. § 290.140.1. 
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The Missouri Service Letter Statute has been strictly construed to protect 
only employees working in Missouri for a corporation doing business in 
Missouri.57  Public employers or public entities, including municipalities and 
municipal corporations, are not “corporation[s] doing business in the state” 
within the meaning of the statute.58  In contrast, the new Missouri employer 
immunity statute is applicable to nearly all employers in the state, both private 
and public.59 
The history of the Service Letter Statute demonstrates another sharp 
contrast with the new law: the Service Letter Statute was designed to protect 
the employee’s ability to move from job to job unhindered by the inability to 
obtain a reference from his or her past employers.60  The new statute, however, 
 
 57. See Cordon v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 1064, 1068 (D. Kan. 1977) 
(holding Service Letter Statute protects only those persons actually employed in Missouri); 
Ramm v. Dempster Sys., Inc., 601 F. Supp. 114, 116 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (finding that an employee 
originally hired in Missouri and who worked for sometime in Missouri was not an “employee” 
for purposes of Service Letter Statute). 
 58. Krasney v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 765 S.W.2d 646, 651 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); 
Sprenger v. City of Springfield, 629 S.W.2d 493, 493-94 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Hunt v. St. Louis 
Hous. Auth., 573 S.W.2d 728, 730-31 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978). 
 59. The Service Letter Statute is applicable to “an employee of any corporation doing 
business in this state and which employs seven or more employees . . . .”  MO. REV. STAT. § 
290.140.1. 
 60. In the early case of Cheek v. Prudential Ins. Co., the Missouri Supreme Court put the 
statute into historical perspective.  192 S.W. 387 (Mo. 1916).  The court noted that at the time of 
the statute’s passage, a custom existed among railroads and other corporations not to hire an 
employee who could not produce a satisfactory written referral from his past employer.  See id.  at 
389.  The court stated: 
This custom became so sidespread [sic] and effected such vast numbers of laboring 
people it became a public evil, and worked great injustice and oppression upon large 
numbers of persons who earned their bread by the sweat of their faces.  The statute quoted 
was enacted for the purpose of regulating that custom, not to destroy it (for it contained 
some good and useful elements, enabling the corporations of the state to ascertain the 
degree of the intelligence as well as the honesty, capacity, and efficiency of those whom 
they wished to employ, for whose conduct they are responsible to the public and their 
fellow employees), and thereby remedy the evil which flowed therefrom. 
Id.  In Cheek, the Missouri Supreme Court held that the Service Letter Statute was not an 
infringement of a corporation’s due process rights or equal protection rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  See id.  The Supreme Court upheld the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision and 
stated: 
What [is] more reasonable than for the Legislature of Missouri to deem that the public 
interest required it to treat corporations as having, in a peculiar degree, the reputation and 
well-being of their former employees in their keeping, and to convert what otherwise 
might be but a legal privilege, or under prevailing customs a “moral duty,” into a legal 
duty . . . . 
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 546 (1922). 
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is designed to encourage the voluntary free-flow of information among 
employers.61 
Although their basic purposes may differ, the two laws share some 
features.  Just as the Service Letter Statute currently purports to prohibit an 
award of punitive damages based on the content of a service letter, the new 
statute attempts to protect employers from punitive damage awards based on a 
reference.62  Finally, the language of the new statute proscribing the contents 
of any response made pursuant to the statute’s requirements tracks the 
language defining the contents of a service letter.63  Thus, it is likely Missouri 
courts will look to case law that has developed under the Service Letter Statute 
to assist them in construing the new statute. 
a. The History of the Service Letter Statute 
Missouri’s Service Letter Statute was first enacted in 1905.64  The statute 
provided that a failure to issue a service letter was punishable by a fine not to 
exceed five hundred dollars or by imprisonment in the county jail for a period 
not exceeding one year, or both.65  When originally enacted the Service Letter 
Statute did not provide for civil liability; however, the Missouri Supreme Court 
held that the statute created a private cause of action for a failure to issue a 
service letter that supported awards of both actual and punitive damages.66 
 
 61. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text (discussing the primary sponsor’s remarks 
regarding the purposes of the new statute). 
 62. Compare MO. REV. STAT. § 290.140.2, with MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.5. 
 63. Compare MO. REV. STAT. § 290.140.2, with MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.5. 
 64. The Act from which the statute was derived was entitled, “An act for the protection of 
laboring men by requiring employing corporations to give letter showing service of employe [sic] 
quitting service of such corporation, and providing for penalty for violation of this act.”  1905 
Mo. Laws 178. 
 65. MO. REV. STAT. § 3020 (1909). 
 66. See Cheek, 192 S.W. 387.  See also Ralph K. Soebbing, The Missouri Service Letter 
Statute, 31 MO. L. REV. 505, 510-12 (1966).  Note that at least one Missouri court decision 
suggests that a letter issued pursuant to Missouri’s Service Letter Statute likewise could be used 
to support a claim of retaliation pursuant to Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act and the 
Missouri Human Rights Act.  Blandin v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., No. 4:96CV1130-DJS, 1997 WL 
581562, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 25, 1997).  In Blandin, the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Missouri found that a plaintiff could rely on an employer’s failure to supply a 
properly requested service letter to establish a prima facie case of retaliation.  See id. at *8-*9.  
The Blandin court found, however, that “Marriott’s failure to provide plaintiff with a service 
letter and the ‘vague harm’ which she alleges as a result [did] not rise to the level of an adverse 
employment action.”  Id.  Nevertheless, it is clear the Blandin court left open the possibility that 
failure to issue a service letter could form the basis for an action for retaliation under a number of 
state and federal anti-discrimination statutes, thus creating a whole new class of litigation under 
Missouri’s Service Letter Statute. 
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In 1982, the Missouri Legislature revisited the language of the Service 
Letter Statute.67  Presumably, a major purpose of the 1982 amendment was to 
“limit punitive damage awards to cases where no letter is timely furnished, and 
to preclude punitive awards based upon the content of the letter.”68  The 
amendment did not preclude an award of punitive damages in cases where the 
employer fails to issue a service letter at all.69 
It appears, however, that the legislative attempt to limit punitive damages 
to cases in which no service letter is issued has been largely unavailing.  
Contrary to the legislative amendment, Missouri courts continue to hold that an 
insufficient response or a response that falsely states the reasons for 
termination is tantamount to a failure to issue a service letter and may entitle a 
plaintiff to punitive damages.70 
 
 67. See Ryburn v. General Heating & Cooling, Co., 887 S.W.2d 604, 607 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1994).  See also William C. Martucci & Mark P. Johnson, Recent Developments in Missouri: 
Labor and Employment Law, 53 UMKC. L. REV. 509, 515 (1985).  In its present embodiment, the 
Service Letter Statute no longer makes it a criminal offense to fail to supply a service letter.  See 
MO. REV. STAT. § 290.140. 
 68. See Ryburn, 887 S.W.2d at 607.  The language limiting the award of punitive damages 
under the amended Service Letter Statute was carried forward into the new reference immunity 
statute.  However, under the Service Letter Statute, an employer’s response is required if a proper 
request is received, whereas under the new statute an employer’s compliance is voluntary.  See 
also infra notes 238-44 (discussing how the voluntary nature of the new statute creates a major 
ambiguity because it is difficult to conceive of an award of punitive damages for failure to 
comply with a statute that is voluntary). 
 69. See Martucci & Johnson, supra note 67, at 515.  In Talbert v. Safeway Stores, Inc., the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri noted with concern that the 
“Missouri General Assembly did not explain what would constitute a failure ‘to issue the 
requested letter.’”  651 F. Supp. 1563, 1565 (E.D. Mo. 1987).  The court noted that there are at 
least four possible meanings to the phrase “failure to issue the requested letter” including: 
1) the employer failed to issue a letter to the day of trial; 2) the employer issued a letter 
that purported to be a service letter but, in fact, was not; 3) the employer failed to issue a 
letter within the 45 day time period; and 4) the employer unreasonably delayed in issuing 
a letter. 
Id.  The court held, using principles of statutory construction, that if an employer issues a letter 
more than 45 days after it is requested, the employer has failed to issue a service letter and the 
employee is entitled to seek punitive damages.  See id. at 1565-66. 
 70. In Van Sickle v. Katz Drug Co., an employer testified regarding his failure to state the 
true reason for an employee’s discharge, “I didn’t want to harm this young man.  I didn’t want to 
say anything in any way that would be harmful to him in obtaining other employment.”  151 S.W. 
2d 489, 494 (Mo. Ct. App. 1941).  While commending the employer’s desire to protect the former 
employee, the court found that the employer “had conscious knowledge” of his legal duty under, 
and failure to comply with, the statute and that these facts supported an award of punitive 
damages.  Id.  See also Brooks v. Woodline Motor Freight, Inc., 852 F.2d 1061, 1067 (8th Cir. 
1988) (“[A]n untimely service letter constitutes a complete failure to issue a service letter that 
will support both compensatory and punitive damages.”); Stark v. American Bakeries Co., 647 
S.W.2d 119, 123 (Mo. 1983) (en banc) (“Because the reason ‘your work was unsatisfactory’ 
would not enable plaintiff to meet and rebut severely impairing ‘facts’ stated by his former 
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b. Litigation under the Service Letter Statute 
The court determines the sufficiency of the employer’s response to a 
proper request for a service letter as a matter of law.71  For example, the 
Missouri Court of Appeals held that a service letter that included the cause of 
the employee’s discharge, but not the duration of the employee’s employment 
or the character of the employee’s service did not meet the requirements of a 
proper service letter.72  Also, Missouri courts have held that service letters 
stating that the employee was discharged for “unsatisfactory work” are too 
vague to satisfy the requirements of the Service Letter Statute.73  Thus, 
generalities regarding an employee’s termination will ordinarily not meet the 
statutory requirements that a valid, clear, and true reason for an employee’s 
discharge be given.74 
One of the most litigated requirements of the Service Letter Statute 
mandates that employers state the “true reasons” for an employee’s 
discharge.75  As the Missouri Supreme Court explained in Labrier v. Anheuser 
Ford, Inc.: 
 
corporate employer, we conclude it is too vague to constitute a ‘cause’ for discharge under           
§ 290.140, RSMO 1969.”); J & J Home Builders, Inc. v. Hasty, 989 S.W.2d 614, 617 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1999) (holding company’s failure to sign service letter, even though on company letterhead, 
constituted refusal to issue requested letter exposing company to punitive damage award); Hills v. 
McComas Rentals, Inc., 779 S.W.2d 297, 300 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (failing to provide duration of 
employment or character of service held equivalent to non-issuance of service letter); Ball v. 
American Greetings Corp., 752 S.W.2d 814, 821 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (failing to state cause for 
discharge constitutes refusal to issue the service letter and supports award of punitive damages).  
But see Kincaid v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 750 S.W.2d 550, 554 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (holding 
employee not entitled to punitive damages where employer’s response is incomplete; not 
complete failure to issue); Hendrix v. Wainwright Indus., 755 S.W.2d 411, 413 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1988) (holding employee barred from seeking punitive damages because service letter provided 
and employee challenged substance of letter). 
 71. See Newton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 700 F.2d 419, 420 (8th Cir. 1983). 
 72. See Hills, 779 S.W.2d at 300. 
 73. Gloria v. University of Health Science, 713 S.W.2d 32, 33 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). In 
Stark, the Missouri Supreme Court reasoned that a service letter citing “unsatisfactory work” as 
the reason for an employee’s termination, even if the work was unsatisfactory in some respect, 
would not allow an employee to challenge any allegedly false statements that his work was not 
satisfactory in other, possibly vital, respects.  647 S.W.2d at 123. 
 74. Cumby v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 524 S.W.2d 132, 135 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).  See also 
Gerharter v. Mitchelhill Seed Co., 157 S.W.2d 577, 580-81 (Mo. Ct. App. 1941) (holding letter 
which included dates of employment and was signed by the president of the corporation, 
indicating that the employee’s services were satisfactory but no longer required insufficient to 
comply with statute).  But see Kincaid, 750 S.W.2d at 554 (employer’s response to a service letter 
request that indicated the employee had resigned, rather than been terminated, was found to be 
not so incomplete as to be equivalent to a failure to send a letter at all). 
 75. See MO. REV. STAT. § 290.140.1. 
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There is a distinction between the reasons themselves being true and the 
reasons given for discharge as being the actual ones for which the plaintiff was 
dismissed.  The statute only requires the latter . . . . Therefore, even though the 
reasons stated may themselves be incorrect, they still may be the real reasons 
the employer discharged its employee.  In such a case, an employer satisfies its 
obligations under the statute when it states the truth as to discharge reasons, 
even though they may be incorrect.76 
The Missouri Supreme Court outlined the burden of proof in a lawsuit 
challenging the “true reasons” for discharge in Stark v. American Bakeries 
Co.77  The Stark court cited with approval the decision of the Court of Appeals 
for the Western District of Missouri in Newman v. Greater Kansas City Baptist 
and Community Hospital Association,78 which noted that a plaintiff’s burden 
under the statute is a subjective one: 
[T]he service letter gave as the cause of discharge: “Theft of personal property 
on hospital premises.”  At trial, plaintiff produced evidence that she was not 
guilty of theft.  Reversing judgment for plaintiff, the court opined, “. . . [sic] 
the evidence that [plaintiff] did not steal proves merely that the statement that 
she did steal was false, not that the reason stated for discharge was false.  In 
fact, the evidence allows no inference other than that she was terminated 
because . . . the hospital believed she stole.  There was no proof that the reason 
given was a foil for a true but undisclosed cause.  The want of such evidence 
amounted to a lapse to prove a submissible cause of action under § 290.140.”79 
To avoid a directed verdict, a plaintiff trying to establish that an employer 
failed to state the true reason for discharge “need not prove the true reason for 
his discharge but must cite substantial evidence that the stated reason is not the 
true reason for his discharge.”80 
c. Damages Under the Service Letter Statute 
Missouri courts have repeatedly found that the failure of an employer to 
issue a service letter when requested entitles the employee to nominal damages 
even absent proof of actual injury.81  In order for an employee to recover actual 
damages under the statute, the employee must prove: 
 
 76. 621 S.W.2d 51, 57 n.2 (Mo. 1981) (en banc). 
 77. 647 S.W.2d 119 (Mo. 1983) (en banc). 
 78. 604 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) 
 79. Stark, 647 S.W.2d at 124 n.7 (citations omitted). 
 80. Id. at 124 n.5 (citations omitted). 
 81. See Thompson v. Skelgas, Inc., 896 S.W.2d 645, 647 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).  See also 
Herberholt v. dePaul Community Health Ctr., 625 S.W.2d 617, 622 (Mo. 1981) (en banc) (citing 
Heuer v. John R. Thompson Co., 251 S.W.2d 980, 985 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952)) (“The failure to give 
a proper service letter constituted an invasion of plaintiff’s legal rights and without proof of any 
damages whatever entitled plaintiff to a verdict for nominal damages.”). 
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(1) that on or about an approximate date the plaintiff was either refused 
employment or hindered in obtaining such employment; (2) that the refusal or 
hindrance was caused by the absence or inadequacy of the service letter; (3) 
that the position the plaintiff had difficulty in obtaining was actually open; and 
(4) the salary rate of that position.82 
The standard under which a Missouri plaintiff may be entitled to an award 
of punitive damages was defined by the Missouri Supreme Court in Burnett v. 
Griffith as “conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant’s evil motive 
or reckless indifference to the rights of others.”83  Courts have upheld the 
Burnett standard as the appropriate standard for submission of punitive 
damages under the Service Letter Statute.84 
In Ryburn v. General Heating & Cooling, Co., the Missouri Court of 
Appeals discussed the level of “outrageousness” necessary to support an award 
of punitive damages in a service letter case.85  The Ryburn court rejected the 
argument of the defendant employer that the term “outrageous,” as used in 
Burnett, was equivalent to the degree of outrageousness needed to support a 
claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.86  The Ryburn court stated: 
It may seem anomalous that the standard for imposition of punitive damages 
might be a lower degree of outrageousness than the standard to award 
compensatory damages in a tort action of outrage.  However, the reluctance of 
the courts to open the floodgates of claims for the tort of outrage have caused 
the courts to maintain a very high threshold for such claims . . . .87 
The standard for a punitive damage award in a service letter action requires 
proof that would support a finding of outrageousness “based upon a wanton 
mental state—a knowing and conscious disregard of the right or the welfare of 
another.”88  Accordingly, a defendant’s reckless indifference to the rights of 
 
 82. Herberholt, 625 S.W.2d at 622-23 (citing Rotermund v. Basic Materials Co., 558 
S.W.2d 688, 691-92 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977)).  See also Grasle v. Jenny Craig Weight Loss Centres, 
Inc., 167 F.R.D. 406, 413-14 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (Fact that employee asked for service letter by 
prospective employer, standing alone, insufficient to prove actual damages.  There must be a 
showing that the employer actually held the service letter against the plaintiff); Labrier v. 
Anheuser Ford, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 51, 57 (Mo. 1981) (en banc). 
 83. Burnett v. Griffith, 769 S.W.2d 780, 789 (Mo. 1989) (en banc). 
 84. See Ryburn, 887 S.W.2d at 608 n.2 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (citation omitted) (“The parties 
in this case have assumed, and we assume, that a claim of violation of the service letter law is 
equivalent to an intentional tort for purposes of the appropriate standard for submission of 
punitive damages.”); Hills v. McComas Rentals, Inc., 779 S.W.2d 297, 302 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) 
(citing Burnett v. Griffith, 769 S.W.2d 780,787 (Mo. 1989)) (“While the Burnett decision 
involves punitive damages in cases of intentional torts, we find it analogous to the statutory 
imposition of punitive damages.”). 
 85. 887 S.W.2d at 608-09. 
 86. Id. at 608. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 609. 
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others will support a finding of outrageousness and hence, an award of punitive 
damages to a service letter plaintiff in Missouri.89 
Courts may likely apply the standards governing an award of damages 
under the Service Letter Statute when construing the new employer immunity 
law.  The language describing the contents of any response made under the 
new law mirrors the language of the required contents of a service letter.90  The 
new statute also borrows language from the standards used by Missouri courts 
in deciding common law defamation claims.91  Thus, the courts may rely on 
common law defamation jurisprudence to determine when the privilege 
bestowed by the new statute has been overcome, entitling an employee to 
damages for a defamatory reference. 
B. Defamation in the Employment Context 
While retaining the common law characteristics of libel and slander, 
Missouri courts consider both causes of action under the single tort label of 
defamation.92  Additionally, Missouri courts no longer distinguish between per 
se93 and per quod94 defamation.95  Under Missouri law, an employee wishing 
 
 89. See id.  See also J & J Homebuilders, Inc., v. Hasty, 989 S.W.2d 614, 616 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1999).  In J & J, the court stated: 
[T]he jury could reasonably conclude that failing to sign the letter, sending the letter to 
her former address two weeks after it was prepared and providing an erroneous date of 
termination was outrageous because of J & J’s reckless indifference [to] the rights of Ms. 
Hasty under the statute.  The evidence shows that [Defendant’s Vice-President] spoke 
with her attorney regarding the service letter and was cognizant of the requirements of the 
service letter statute and that she did not review or sign the letter before it was sent.  In 
entering its verdict, the jury did not believe the deficiencies in the letter were inadvertent 
or mistakes as J & J contends.  Accordingly, the trial court did not err in submitting the 
issue of punitive damages to the jury. 
Id. at 617. 
 90. Compare MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.2, with MO. REV. STAT. § 290.140.1. 
 91. Compare “[f]or purposes of this section, an employer shall be immune from civil 
liability for any response made pursuant to this section . . . unless such response was false and 
made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard for whether such response was 
true or false,” MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.4, with the common law standard for overcoming the 
qualified privilege that attaches to employee references in Missouri which requires that plaintiff 
prove “the falsity of a statement and knowledge of such falsity (or reckless disregard of plaintiff’s 
rights without knowledge of whether it was true or false) . . . .”  Cash v. Empire Gas Corp., 547 
S.W.2d 830, 834 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (quoting Potter v. Milbank Mfg. Co., 489 S.W.2d 197, 204 
(Mo. 1972)). 
 92. Kennedy v. Jasper, 928 S.W.2d 395, 399 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Henry v. 
Halliburton, 690 S.W.2d 775, 779 (Mo. 1985) (en banc)). 
 93. At early common law, four categories of false statements were considered slander per se 
including: “that the plaintiff was guilty of a crime, afflicted with a loathsome disease, or unchaste, 
as well as false statements that concerned the plaintiff’s ability to engage in his or her occupation 
or business.”  Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 308 (Mo. 1993) (en banc).  If 
a plaintiff was alleging slander per se, the plaintiff did not have to plead damages because 
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to challenge an allegedly defamatory reference must prove: (1) the employer 
made a statement of fact, (2) the statement was of and concerning the plaintiff, 
(3) the statement was false, (4) a third person heard or read the statement (also 
known as the “publication” element),96 (5) the plaintiff’s reputation was 
injured, and (6) the defendant was at fault.97  In order for a statement of fact to 
 
damages were presumed.  See id.  Libel per se “referred to a statement whose defamatory nature 
was apparent upon the face of the publication . . . .”  Id. 
 94. At early common law, slander per quod encompassed words which were not actionable 
as slander per se and a plaintiff was required to both plead and prove “special damages.”  Nazeri, 
860 S.W.2d at 308.  Special damages were those that were capable of being calculated in dollars, 
such as the loss of marriage, employment, income, profits or even gratuitous hospitality.  Carter 
v. Willert Home Prods., Inc., 714 S.W.2d 506, 509 (Mo. 1986) (en banc) (citation omitted).  
Extrinsic facts were necessary in order to label a defamatory statement as libel per quod and proof 
of special damages was also required.  Id. at 509 & n.1. 
 95. In Nazeri, the Missouri Supreme Court stated: 
Although it is clear that respondent’s remarks were defamatory, attempts to characterize 
them as per se or per quod appear more artificial than real.  Unfortunately, the result of 
the classifications may have a very real impact more far-reaching than justified.  In one 
case the jury is free to presume damages.  In the other the jury is precluded from awarding 
actual damages unless special damages are proven. . . . We hold that in defamation cases 
the old rules of per se and per quod do not apply and plaintiff need only to plead and 
prove the unified defamation elements set out in MAI 23.01(1) and 23.01(2).  In short, 
plaintiffs need not concern themselves with whether the defamation is per se or per quod, 
nor with whether special damages exist, but must prove actual damages in all cases. 
860 S.W.2d at 312-13. 
 96. See Saxton, supra note 19, at 69-70. 
 97. See Mark P. Johnson & Joseph W. Miller, An Overview of Libel Law in Missouri, 52 J. 
MO. B. 210, 211 (1996) (citing Moore v. Credit Info. Corp. of Am., 673 F.2d 208 (8th Cir. 
1982)); Nazeri, 860 S.W.2d at 312-13.  To recover at early common law, a defamation plaintiff 
needed only to prove the publication of a false and defamatory statement; the intent or “fault” of 
the defendant was not an issue. John Bruce Lewis, et al., Defamation and the Workplace: A 
Survey of the Law and Proposals for Reform, 54 MO. L. REV. 797, 816 (1989).  The landmark 
case of New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) marked a turning point in the law of 
defamation.  In Sullivan, the Supreme Court attempted to reconcile the principles of freedom of 
speech with defamation law developed by the states by requiring that “actual malice” be proven 
before a public official can recover damages for defamation: 
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public 
official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official 
conduct unless the plaintiff proves the statement was made with ‘actual malice’ – that is, 
with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. 
Id. at 279-80.  A decade later, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347-48 (1974), the 
Court distinguished between public and private defamation plaintiffs, and found that the “actual 
malice” standard should apply to public figures and officials, while the standard for private 
litigants was left to the states to define “so long as they do not impose liability without fault.”  
The standard of fault for private figures announced in Gertz has been called into question by the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Dunn & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 
(1985). Dunn has been read to limit the fault requirement in Gertz to plaintiffs that are private 
figures when the defamatory statement does not involve a matter of public concern.  See Lewis, 
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be defamatory, it must tend to “harm the reputation of another as to lower him 
in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from desiring to 
associate or deal with him.”98 
The initial determination as to whether a statement is defamatory is a 
question of law decided by the court.99  When determining whether a statement 
is defamatory, Missouri courts consider the statement in context, not in 
isolation.100  Once the court determines that a statement is defamatory, the 
court examines whether one or more privileges or defenses protect the 
defendant from liability.101 
a. Common Law Defenses to a Defamation Claim 
Privileged communications are divided into two general categories: 
communications that are absolutely privileged102 and those that are qualifiedly 
or conditionally privileged.103  If a communication is absolutely privileged, 
even intentional false statements are immune from suit, while a qualifiedly or 
conditionally privileged communication is immune only if the privilege is not 
abused and the defamatory statements are published in good faith and without 
malice.104 
 
supra, at 817.  At least one commentator has noted that Dunn does not significantly impact 
defamation claims in the workplace because most employees are private individuals and 
references are not normally of public interest.  See id.  Thus, fault remains a requirement in most 
reference-based claims. See Saxton, supra note 19, at 70-71. 
 98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977).  Comment d to the RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 explains that a communication can be defamatory even absent actual 
harm, so long as the statement has a general tendency to cause such harm.  See id. § 559 cmt. d.  
Thus, there is a difference in determining whether a communication is defamatory and whether 
damages can be recovered.  See id. 
 99. See Pape v. Reither, 918 S.W.2d 376, 379 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996). 
 100. See Buller v. Pulitzer Publ’g Co., 684 S.W.2d 473, 477 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).  See also 
Balderree v. Beeman, 837 S.W.2d 309, 324 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (finding that examined in 
context the only reasonable inference from defendant’s statement that plaintiff “propositioned” 
members of the contractor with whom the employer did business was that plaintiff had “sexually 
propositioned” such members.  According to the court, “[a]ny other holding would ignore today’s 
vernacular.”). 
 101. See Pape, 918 S.W.2d at 380. 
 102. When a statement is absolutely privileged, the defense of privilege is generally not 
required to be set forth in the answer and may be raised by way of a motion to dismiss or a 
motion for summary judgment.  See 50 Am. Jur. 2d Libel & Slander § 457 (1995). 
 103. A qualified or conditional privilege must be pleaded and proved; unless it is 
affirmatively disclosed by the complaint, or the defense, as an issue in the case.  See 50 Am. Jur. 
2d Libel & Slander § 457 (1995).  Failure to raise the qualified privilege as a defense generally 
constitutes a waiver of the defense.  See id.  See also Laun v. Union Elec. Co., 166 S.W.2d 1065, 
1068 (Mo. 1942) (citation omitted) (“The difference in the two classes of privilege is ‘that malice 
destroys the one and does not change the other.’”). 
 104. Laun, 166 S.W.2d at 1068. 
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Absolute immunity is generally confined to a few situations where there is 
an obvious policy in favor of permitting complete freedom of expression, 
without any inquiry as to the defendant’s motives.105  Absolute privilege is 
based upon the public policy of freedom of speech and is generally limited to 
judicial, legislative or executive proceedings.106  The privilege is sometimes 
extended “to occasions where the communication is provided for and required 
by law.”107 
Communications concerning the character of an employee or former 
employee are generally qualifiedly privileged.108  For the privilege to attach, 
the communication must be made in “good faith” concerning a subject in 
which both parties have a common duty or interest.109  Even a false defamatory 
statement in a reference enjoys a qualified privilege under Missouri law if it is 
made in good faith and the employer reasonably believes it to be true.110 
 
 105. See id. See also Wright v. Over-The-Road & City Transfer Drivers, Helpers, Dockmen 
and Warehousemen, 945 S.W.2d 481, 492 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997). 
 106. Pulliam v. Bond, 406 S.W.2d 635, 640 (Mo. 1966). 
 107. See State ex rel. McNary v. Hais, 670 S.W.2d 494, 496 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).  These 
“other occasions” have been held to include proceedings that are “quasi-judicial” in nature.  Id. 
 108. See Cash v. Empire Gas Corp., 547 S.W.2d 830, 833 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (quoting 50 
Am. Jur. 2d Libel & Slander §§ 195, 273 (1995)).  The Missouri Supreme Court has also held that 
information given to a loan company investigating an employee is subject to a qualified privilege.  
In Carter v. Willert Home Prods., the Supreme Court held: 
Although Civil Finance Company was not a prospective employer of plaintiff, it was 
about to enter into a business relationship with plaintiff, and its interest in the information 
was no less substantial that than [sic] of the prospective employer in Cash.  We believe 
that the statements made in this case are likewise, as a matter of law, qualifiedly 
privileged. 
714 S.W.2d 506, 513 (Mo. 1986) (en banc). 
 109. Cash, 547 S.W. 2d at 833. 
 110. In Washington v. Thomas, 778 S.W.2d 792, 795 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989), the resident 
manager of an apartment complex sued the corporation that owned the apartment complex for 
defamation after the complex allegedly published documents “accusing plaintiff of threatening to 
do bodily harm with a loaded weapon to his superiors.”  778 S.W.2d 792, 795 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1989).  The court stated: 
Lack of personal knowledge is no bar to the relating of all relevant information regarding 
a former employee to one who has a definite interest [in] providing it is done in good 
faith, i.e. without serious doubt as to the truth of the information.  Proof of falsity is not 
proof of malice, nor is malice shown by the defamatory nature of the charges nor by the 
failure to investigate. 
Id. at 799 (citations omitted).  In Carmichael v. Wiesemann, 738 S.W.2d 877 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1987), the employer told customers that the employee had been fired for stealing and the 
employee sued for slander.  See id. at 887.  The employee had failed a lie detector test, but denied 
stealing.  See id. at 879-80.  The court held that the plaintiff failed to prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that the defendant realized the statement in which he said that the plaintiff 
“had stolen or that he was fired for stealing was false” or that the defendant “subjectively 
entertained serious doubt as to the truth of such statements.”  Id. at 881. 
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To overcome the qualified privilege that attaches to letters of reference in 
Missouri, the employee has the burden of proving express malice.111  A jury 
then determines whether the showing of malice is sufficient to overcome the 
qualified privilege.112  Missouri’s approved jury instructions on libel and 
slander, however, do not contain the term “malice,”113 instead jurors are 
directed to determine whether the statement was made with “knowledge that it 
was false, or with reckless disregard for whether it was true or false at a time 
when they had serious doubt as to whether they were true . . . .”114  When the 
evidence shows that the defamatory statement was published “for a motive 
inconsistent with the principles that gave rise to the qualified privilege,” malice 
may be present.115 
The common law qualified privilege can be overcome not only by a 
finding of “malice,”116 but also by what is termed “excessive 
dissemination.”117  The “excessive dissemination” exception might exist, for 
example, if publication is made “to persons other than those to whom the 
communication is important and thus privileged.”118  Other ways in which the 
 
 111. Washington, 778 S.W.2d at 834. 
 112. Snodgrass v. Headco Indus., Inc., 630 S.W.2d 147, 153-54 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (citing 
Pulliam v. Bond, 406 S.W.2d 635 (Mo. 1966)). 
 113. In Snodgrass, a defendant in a slander case challenged Missouri’s Approved Instructions 
(MAI), claiming they failed to properly prescribe the plaintiff’s burden when the communication 
is qualifiedly privileged.  630 S.W. 2d at 154.  The MAI on libel and slander track the language 
of the Supreme Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1965) in defining “actual 
malice.”  Snodgrass, 630 S.W.2d at 154.  The drafters of the MAI were apparently cognizant of 
the considerable confusion in case law regarding the proper terminology for the type of malice 
necessary to overcome a qualified privilege, alternately referred to by the courts as “actual 
malice,” “express malice,” “legal malice,” “malice in fact,” and “malice in law.”  Id.  The MAI 
contains but one term “malice” which has only one definition, i.e., “the doing of a wrongful act 
intentionally without just cause or excuse.”  Id. at 154-55 (quoting MAI 16.01).  Because the New 
York Times standard is used in the libel and slander instruction, there is no need for a jury in 
Missouri to find either “legal malice” or “actual malice” to award punitive damages.  Snodgrass, 
640 S.W.2d at 155.  The notes on use to the MAI for libel and slander provide that MAI 4.16 
should be used as a damage instruction.  See id. at 155.  This instruction allows an award of 
punitive damages if the jury finds such damages “will serve to punish the defendant and deter him 
and others from like conduct.”  Id. at 155 (quoting MAI 4.16) (internal quotations omitted). 
 114. Snodgrass, 630 S.W.2d at 154 (citing MAI 23.10(2)).  Note the similarity between this 
language and the language of section 4 of the new statute: “an employer shall be immune from 
civil liability for any response . . . unless such response was false and made with knowledge that 
it was false or with reckless disregard for whether such response was true or false.”  MO. ANN. 
STAT. § 290.152.4. 
 115. Snodgrass, 630 S.W.2d at 154. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Rice v. Hodapp, 919 S.W.2d 240, 244 (Mo. 1996) (en banc). 
 118. See Saxton, supra note 19, at 73.  See also Rice, 919 S.W.2d at 244 (citing Hellesen v. 
Knaus Truck Lines, 370 S.W.2d 341, 345 (Mo. 1963)); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
604 (1977). 
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qualified privilege may be defeated include a showing that the employer 
published information about the employee to a person who did not have an 
important stake or interest in the information; that the published statements 
were not limited to a necessary purpose; or that such statements were made on 
an improper occasion.119 
In addition to the common law qualified privilege, an employer has 
additional defenses against a defamation claim.  Truth may always be asserted 
as an absolute defense to a defamation action.120  The Missouri Constitution 
provides that “in all suits and prosecutions for libel or slander the truth thereof 
may be given in evidence . . . .”121  This tenet remains intact even if the 
reference is made with express malice.122 
Consent is also an absolute defense to defamation.123  The consent defense 
typically applies when, at the employer’s request, an employee has executed a 
waiver of claims based upon any reference or the employee has given written 
consent to an employer to release pertinent information to prospective 
employers.124  The consent defense may also be applicable when an employee 
 
 119. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 603-605A (1977). 
 120. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A (1977) (“One who publishes a 
defamatory statement of fact is not subject to liability for defamation if the statement is true.”).  
See also Pulliam v. Bond, 406 S.W.2d 635, 642 (Mo. 1966) (citing Warren v. Pulitzer Publ’g Co., 
336 Mo. 184, 78 S.W.2d 404, 412(1) (1934)) (“Where all the facts stated are completely true, no 
defense of privilege is necessary since the truth is always a defense to libel.”). 
 121. MO. CONST. art. 1, § 8.  In Rice v. Hodapp, 919 S.W.2d 240 (Mo. 1996) (en banc) , 
plaintiff’s supervisor held an employee meeting after plaintiff was suspended for three days for 
sexual harassment.  See id. at 242.  On appeal, Rice asserted that he was not guilty of sexual 
harassment and that any statements to the contrary made by his supervisor at the employee 
meeting were false, and thus actionable.  See id. at 243.  The Supreme Court disagreed: 
  First, Rice asserts that his supervisor stated that ‘there had been an investigation of 
charges of sexual harassment of female State Farm employees by [Rice] and that as a 
result of said investigation [Rice] was being transferred.’  All parties agree that there was 
indeed an investigation and Rice was transferred.  Truth is an absolute defense to the first 
statement alleged. 
  Second, Rice points to one employee’s affidavit stating that the supervisor told the 
employees at the meeting that ‘a sexual harassment investigation had been concluded and 
two individuals were found guilty of such conduct.’  Rice asserts that he was not guilty 
and thus, was defamed by the statement.  Clearly, the statement was true in the sense that 
State Farm management, after an investigation, believed Rice had committed sexual 
harassment. 
Id. at 243-44. 
 122. See Cook v. Pulitzer Publ’g Co., 145 S.W.2d 480, 490 (Mo. 1912). 
 123. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 583 (1977).  See also Turner v. Gateway 
Transp. Co., 569 S.W.2d 358, 360 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (citing Hellesen v. Knaus Truck Lines, 
Inc., 370 S.W.2d 341 (Mo. 1966)). 
 124. See Adler & Pierce, supra note 3, at 1404. 
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contractually agrees to follow certain policies related to his discharge or 
separation from employment.125 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides an 
absolute privilege for statements of opinion regardless of whether the 
statement is made maliciously or insincerely.126  Additionally, public entities 
 
 125. See Saxton, supra note 19, at 61-63.  In Turner v. Gateway Transportation Co., 569 
S.W.2d 358 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978), a union member’s discharge letter was automatically sent to the 
Motor Carrier Council of St. Louis (Council), the organization that handled grievances for 
Gateway.  See id. at 359.  The union member argued that he had been libeled when his employer 
published the letter to the Council.  See id. at 360.  The court found that Turner was bound by the 
union contract which provided that discharge letters be forwarded to the Council.  See id.  The 
court held: “plaintiff consented to the procedures followed in this case, and the contents of the 
discharge letter properly sent pursuant to those procedures were absolutely privileged.”  Id. 
 126. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.  Only statements of fact, as opposed to statements of opinion, 
are actionable as defamatory.  See Pape v. Reither, 918 S.W.2d 380, 381 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) 
(“The fact that it might be eventually established in court that the persons accused in these 
statements indeed engaged in fraudulent or illegal conduct does not make the statements 
verifiable; it simply means that the prediction issued in the statements proved accurate.”).  
Statements that contain a mixture of fact and opinion are also actionable.  See Johnson & Miller, 
supra note 97, at 211.  Missouri courts look at the “totality of the circumstances” when 
determining whether a statement is fact, mixed opinion, or pure opinion.  See Henry v. 
Haliburton, 690 S.W.2d 775, 788 (Mo. 1985) (en banc).  For example, an employee of a 
construction firm sued the project owner for defamation for statements made in a settlement letter 
and a letter mailed to the state Board of Architects, Professional Engineers, and Land Surveyors.  
Pape, 918 S.W.2d at 378-79.  The statement in the settlement letter was prefaced with the words 
“[i]t is my position.”  Id. at 380.  The court held that it would be impossible to construe the phrase 
“it is my position” as “positing a verifiable proposition, and verifiability is the crux of the 
fact/opinion distinction in defamation law.”  Id.  The court also found that the defamatory 
statement in the settlement letter was judicially privileged and not actionable.  See id. at 381.  
This distinction between fact and opinion may assist in protecting a Missouri employers’ 
assessment of an employee’s work performance.  See Bernard E. Jacques, Defamation in an 
Employment Context: Selected Issues, WRONGFUL TERMINATION CLAIMS 1999: WHAT 
PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANTS HAVE TO KNOW 721, 728 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course 
Handbook Series No. 600, 1999); Murray Schwartz et al., Claims for Damage to an Employee’s 
Reputation and Future Employment Opportunities, in WRONGFUL TERMINATION CLAIMS 1999: 
WHAT PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANTS HAVE TO KNOW 745, 763-64 (PLI Litig. & Admin. 
Practice Course Handbook Series No. 600, 1999) (“[U]nless the employee is able to assert that 
the statement was based on facts and was not just the opinion of the supervisor, the employee’s 
claim for defamation will fail.”).  But see Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 
314 (“The remarks pleaded in the petition consist of outright expressions of fact and ostensible 
expression of opinion which very strongly imply underlying facts.”); Benner v. Johnson Controls, 
Inc., 813 S.W.2d 16 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991): 
The statement with which defendants are charged – that Deana Benner released 
confidential information – could be in its context a statement of fact; it implies that Deana 
Benner disclosed information about George Benner’s condition which she had gained 
from the medical files in Med Clinic.  The alleged statement meets the test . . . ; it clearly 
“implies an assertion of objective fact.” 
Id. at 20 (citing Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990)). 
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may be able to defend against a claim of defamation on sovereign immunity 
grounds.127  Sovereign immunity generally protects public entities from suit in 
tort, in the absence of an express statutory waiver.128 
Although a number of defenses are available to employers who provide an 
accurate assessment of an employee’s performance, many employers are still 
reluctant to part with their “no comment” or neutral job reference policies.129  
Yet under the doctrine of self-compelled publication, an employer may be held 
liable for defaming an employee even if he says nothing at all. 
b. A New Twist on an Old Claim 
Until relatively recently, the publication element of the common law tort of 
defamation required the defendant to have “publicized” the defamatory 
statement to at least one person in addition to the plaintiff.130  The publication 
requirement is thus based on a principle of common sense; it is simply not 
possible to harm the plaintiff’s reputation if only the plaintiff heard, read or 
saw what the defendant communicated about the plaintiff.131 
Despite this “common sense” policy, an emerging doctrine currently 
adopted by a minority of jurisdictions, including Missouri, allows a relaxation 
of the traditional publication requirement in the employment context.132  The 
doctrine of “compelled self-publication,” permits a plaintiff employee to 
satisfy the publication element in a defamation action if the employee proves 
that he or she was wrongfully dismissed and was subsequently compelled to 
inform prospective employers of the reason for the dismissal.133  In Missouri to 
make out a claim of compelled self-publication defamation, a plaintiff must 
show: 
(1) that the employer stated a false reason for termination; (2) that the 
employer knew the statement was false or had serious doubt about its truth 
when it was made; (3) that the employer intended or had reason to suppose that 
the statement would be disclosed to a third party; (4) that the statement tended 
to expose the employee to contempt within his profession; (5) that the 
 
 127. See MO. CONST. art. IX, § 9a. 
 128. See Krasney v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 765 S.W.2d 646, 650 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989). 
 129. See supra notes 2-25 and accompanying text (discussing employers’ reluctance to 
respond to reference requests). 
 130. See Arlen W. Langvardt, Defamation In The Employment Discharge Context: The 
Emerging Doctrine Of Compelled Self-Publication, 26 DUQ. L. REV. 227, 242 (1998). 
 131. See id. 
 132. See id. at 230, 243-44 & n.79. 
 133. See Charles S. Murray, Jr., Compelled Self-Publication in the Employment Context: A 
Consistent Exception to Defamation Requirement of Publication, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 295, 
297 (1988). 
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statement was communicated to prospective employers; and (6) that the 
employee suffered actual damages to his reputation.134 
To prove actual damages in the context of a compelled self-publication 
defamation action, a Missouri employee must demonstrate a nexus between the 
employer’s false statement and the loss of a job opportunity.135  The sole fact 
that a false statement was communicated to a prospective employer is 
insufficient to establish the necessary causal connection.136  An employee must 
prove that he or she was denied employment because a prospective employer 
in fact relied on the false statement.137 
The doctrine of self-compelled defamation is not the only new weapon in a 
plaintiff’s arsenal to assist in challenging an allegedly defamatory employment 
reference.  A recent Supreme Court decision has created another new avenue 
under Title VII by which an employee may seek to hold an employer liable for 
such a reference. 
3. Title VII Retaliation Claims 
In 1997, the United States Supreme Court held that a former employer 
might be held liable under Title VII138 for retaliatory discharge139 based on a 
 
 134. Arthaud v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 170 F.3d 860, 862 (8th Cir. 1999).  In Neighbors 
v. Kirksville College of Osteopathic Med., 694 S.W.2d 822 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985), the Missouri 
Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of a libel claim based upon a service letter citing 50 Am. 
Jur. 2d, Libel & Slander § 148 (1970): 
Many cases make an exception to or qualification of the general rule that there must be a 
communication to others than the person defamed, where the utterer of the defamatory 
matter intends, or has reason to suppose, that in the ordinary course of events the matter 
will come to the knowledge of some third person. 
Neighbors, 694 S.W.2d 822, 824  (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). 
 135. See Arthaud, 170 F.3d at 862. 
 136. See id. 
 137. See Jasperson v. Purolator Courier Corp., 765 F.2d 736, 742 (8th Cir. 1985). 
 138. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e –2(a)(1)-(2) (1994), 
provides in pertinent part: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer 
  (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privilege of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin; or 
  (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any 
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities 
or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, 
color, religion, sex or national origin. 
Id. 
 139. Title VII also prohibits an employer, with fifteen or more employees, from retaliating 
against an employee for filing a charge pursuant to the statute.  Title VII provides, in pertinent 
part: 
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negative reference.140  In Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., the plaintiff alleged that 
she was terminated from her position in retaliation for filing a claim with the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.141  The Supreme Court 
concluded that Congress intended Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision to 
extend to current and former employees and to encourage victims of 
discrimination to file claims under Title VII even if the retaliation occurred 
subsequent to the time of employment.142 
Missouri courts have yet to find that a negative reference is sufficient to 
establish a plaintiff’s prima facie case of retaliatory discharge under Title VII.  
However, the decision of at least one Missouri district court to dismiss a claim 
based on a negative reference has been reversed as a result of the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Robinson.143  Additionally, the Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals has held that the holding in Robinson is pertinent not only to 
retaliation claims brought under Title VII, but also to claims of retaliation 
brought pursuant to the Missouri Human Rights Act and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act.144 
The Supreme Court’s holding in Robinson, litigation under the Service 
Letter Statute, and threats of suits for defamation encourage employers to 
 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any 
of his employees or applicants for employment . . . because he has opposed any practice 
made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a 
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or 
hearing under this subchapter. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 
 140. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997). 
 141. See id.  Note also that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is the federal 
agency responsible for enforcing Title VII.  See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. 
 142. See Robinson, 519 U.S. at 346.  The Supreme Court reasoned that if Congress had 
intended the anti-retaliation provisions of Title VII only to apply to current employees, Congress 
would have expressly limited the reach of the anti-retaliation provision to “current” employees.  
Id. at 341-42. 
 143. See Smith v. St. Louis Univ., 109 F.3d 1261 (8th Cir. 1997): 
Although the District court held, and the University argues, that Title VII does not provide 
a cause of action for retaliation that took place after employment has concluded, the 
Supreme Court has now held that Title VII’s protections from retaliation extend to former 
employees . . . and Smith may therefore recover for retaliation taken after her residency 
ended. 
 . . . . 
If Schweiss provided negative references to Smith’s potential employers, as she contends, 
and she demonstrates that he did so because she had complained about his harassment, 
then a jury could reasonably conclude that the University was liable under Title VII for 
retaliation. 
Id. at 1266 (citation omitted). 
 144. See Blandin v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., No. 4:96CV1130-DJS, 1997 WL 581562, at *8 (E.D. 
Mo. Aug. 25, 1997). 
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include little or no information in an employee reference.145  These 
disincentives to establishing more open reference policies are reinforced by the 
possibility that a decision to provide a reference may expose an employer to 
liability to third parties.  Reference-based claims that may be brought by third 
parties include allegations of negligent hiring and misrepresentation. 
B. Reference Based Claims Brought by Third Parties 
1. Negligent Hiring 
In Gaines v. Monsanto Co., the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern 
District held that an employer might be held directly liable for negligent hiring 
of an employee where “the employer knew or should have known of the 
employee’s dangerous proclivities and the employer’s negligence was the 
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury.”146  The Gaines court found that 
“[l]iability would depend, among other things, on the nature of the criminal 
record and the surrounding circumstances.”147  Accordingly, a typical negligent 
hiring claim turns on whether an employer adequately investigated a 
prospective employee’s background to determine the applicant’s fitness for the 
position.148  The magnitude of necessary investigation differs depending on the 
type of job the applicant seeks.149 
Thus, Missouri courts have imposed a duty on employers with sufficient 
cause to inquire into a prospective employee’s background.  Nevertheless, it 
appears Missouri courts have yet to impose a corresponding duty on employers 
to warn prospective employers of the applicant’s dangerous propensities.  Such 
a duty is the touchstone of the emerging cause of action of negligent 
misrepresentation or referral. 
 
 145. See Oliver, supra note 3, at 694-96 (discussing factors that encourage employers to adopt 
“no comment” or neutral job reference policies). 
 146. 655 S.W.2d 568, 570 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983). 
 147. Id. at 571 n.2 (citation omitted). 
 148. See J. Bradley Buckhalter, Comment, Speak No Evil: Negligent Employment Referral 
and the Employer’s Duty to Warn (or, How Employers Can Have Their Cake and Eat It Too), 22 
SEATTLE U.L. REV. 265, 273 (1998) (citations omitted). 
 149. See Janet Swerdlow, Note, Negligent Referral: A Potential Theory for Employer 
Liability, 64 S.C. L. REV. 1645, 1650 (1991).  In Hollingsworth v. Quick, 770 S.W.2d 291 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1989), the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District specifically declined the 
plaintiff’s invitation to impose a duty on employers whose employees have contact with the 
public to conduct a police and court records check on an applicant.  See id. at 294.  The court 
stated that under such a duty “an employer who fails to make such an inquiry, even though not 
alerted to do so by circumstances or information associated with a particular job applicant, may 
be held liable if the employee later becomes involved in a confrontation . . . .”  Id. 
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2. Negligent Misrepresentation or Referral 
Recent court decisions, including those in California, New Mexico and 
Colorado, may be indicative of the judiciary’s willingness to rely on a theory 
of negligent misrepresentation to hold employers liable when they choose to 
provide a reference and misrepresent or omit relevant admonitory information 
about an employee.150  In Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified School District, a 
school district described its former vice-principal in glowing terms and 
unconditionally recommended him for an administrative position in another 
school district.151  The recommendation was made even though the school 
district knew that the vice-principal had been forced to resign under pressure 
due to his sexual misconduct involving female students.152  After securing a 
job with a new school district based, at least in part, on the recommendation of 
his prior employer, the administrator molested a thirteen year-old student in the 
new district.153  The student sued the vice-principal’s former employers and 
included an allegation of negligent misrepresentation in her complaint.154 
The California Supreme Court ruled that the omission of information 
concerning the sexual misconduct allegations, coupled with the unconditional 
recommendation, amounted to an affirmative misrepresentation.155  The court 
held that the former employer school district owed a duty to the injured student 
to refrain from misrepresenting its former employee’s qualifications.156  The 
court relied on sections 310157 and 311158 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
 
 150. See Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 929 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1997); Davis v. 
Board of County Comm’rs, 987 P.2d 1172 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999); Fluid Tech., Inc. v. CVJ Axles, 
Inc., 964 P.2d 614 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998).  See also Gutzan v. Altair Airlines, inc., 766 F.2d 135, 
140 (3rd Cir. 1985) (recognizing a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation, citing to 
RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 311A, 324A (1965); Golden Spread Council, Inc. v. 
Akins, 926 S.W.2d 287, 291 (Tex. 1996) (recognizing cause of action for negligent 
misrepresentation relying on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302B (1965).  But see Cohen 
v. Wales 133 A.2d 94 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (refusing to recognize a duty when recommending 
former employees “where another party is responsible for the actual hiring”). 
 151. 929 P.2d at 584-85. 
 152. See id. at 593. 
 153. See id. at 585. 
 154. See id. at 585-86. 
 155. See id. at 592-93. 
 156. See Muroc, 929 P.2d at 591. 
 157. Section 310 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS states in pertinent part: 
  An actor who makes a misrepresentation is subject to liability to another for physical 
harm which results from an act done by the other or a third person in reliance upon the 
truth of the representation, if the actor: 
  (a) intends his statement to induce or should realize that it is likely to induce action 
by the other, or a third person, which involved an unreasonable risk of physical harm to 
the other, and 
  (b) knows 
(i) that the statement is false, or 
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TORTS, in holding that the former employer was liable to the injured student.159  
The court did attempt to limit its holding by restricting the duty not to 
misrepresent only to instances where the making of representations “would 
present a substantial, foreseeable risk of physical injury to the prospective 
employer or third person.”160  The court ruled that no duty to disclose is 
present in the absence of resulting physical injury or a special relationship 
between the parties.161 
The Muroc court also addressed the applicability of California’s shield 
law.  The California Supreme Court was reluctant to find that the shield law 
would protect employers from suits by injured third parties.162  According to 
the court, legislative material provided by amicus curiae indicated that the state 
law was “primarily intended to provide employers with a defense to actions by 
former employees” and not to “insulate them from all tort liability arising from 
employment disclosures.”163  Second, the court found the state’s reference 
immunity statute was inapplicable to the Muroc facts because the information 
provided by the administrator’s past employer was unsolicited, rather than 
provided “upon request,” as required by the California shield law.164 
Recently, a New Mexico state appeals court held, as did the Muroc court, 
that under the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311, an employer owes a 
 
(ii) that he has not the knowledge which he professes. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 310 (1965). 
 158. Section 311 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS states in relevant part: 
  (1) One who negligently gives false information to another is subject to liability for 
physical harm caused by action taken by the other in reasonable reliance upon such 
information, where such harm results 
  (a) to the other, or 
  (b) to such third persons as the actor should expect to be put in peril by the action 
taken. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311 (1965). 
 159. Muroc, 929 P.2d at 591.  The Muroc court rejected arguments from the former employer 
that once an employer decided to provide a reference, they would be forced to include all negative 
information, including unproven rumors about former employees.  See id.  This risk, the school 
district argued would simply encourage employers to adopt “no comment” policies or merely to 
confirm only employee’s positions, salaries and dates of employment.  Id. at 590.  The Muroc 
court found that an employer’s qualified privilege for providing a reference would provide 
sufficient protection to encourage the exchange of reference information in the typical situation.  
See id. at 590-91. 
 160. Muroc, 929 P.2d at 591. 
 161. See id.  According to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 315 cmt. c (1965), a 
“special relationship” is found where the defendant has “a duty to take action for the aid or 
protection of the plaintiff.”  Id.  For example, special relationships have been found to exist 
between physiotherapist-patient, state parole boards and parolees, bartenders and patrons.  See 
Adler & Pierce, supra note 3, at 1442 n.296 (collecting cases). 
 162. See Muroc, 964 P.2d at 591. 
 163. Id.  See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 47c (West 1992 & Supp. 1997). 
 164. 964 P.2d at 591.  See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 47c. 
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duty of care to a third-party victim when making employment 
recommendations.165  In Davis v. Board of County Commissioners, law 
enforcement personnel provided an unqualifiedly favorable employment 
reference to an employee who had resigned instead of facing disciplinary 
action for documented sexual harassment.166  The employee was hired by a 
psychiatric hospital where he was then accused of sexually harassing a female 
inmate.167  In reversing summary judgment for the employer, the court held 
that once the defendants elected to make recommendations, they owed a duty 
of care “in regard to what they said and what they omitted from their 
references.”168  The court found that the defendants had created a “special 
relationship” with the plaintiff by undertaking to supply a reference.169  In 
acknowledging that the issue of “foreseeability” was one for the jury, the court 
wrote: 
We are not persuaded that reasonable people, who had the information 
possessed by [defendants], would not have foreseen potential victims like 
Plaintiff, and could not have foreseen how the omission of objective 
information, like [defendant’s] report and disciplinary actions taken, would not 
pose a threat of physical harm to persons like Plaintiff.170 
The court rejected defendants’ argument that expansion of a tort duty would 
have a “chilling effect” on the willingness of employers to give references.171  
Instead, the court concluded that the state’s common law qualified privilege 
and its shield law provided an adequate counter-balance to the imposition of a 
“sufficiently restricted” duty not to misrepresent in an employment reference 
when there is a foreseeable risk of harm.172 
In Fluid Technology, Inc. v. CVJ Axles, Inc., the defendant provided a 
reference for a former bookkeeper asserting that she had been a “fine 
employee,” despite the fact she had been terminated for stealing and had 
consequently been convicted of the theft.173  The Colorado Court of Appeals 
found the plaintiff had stated a claim for relief under the RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) which provides: 
One who, in the course of business, profession or employment, or in any other 
transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for 
the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for 
pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the 
 
 165. See Davis v. Board of County Comm’rs, 987 P.2d 1172, 1180 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999). 
 166. Id. at 1175-76. 
 167. See id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 1180. 
 170. Davis, 964 P.2d at 1180. 
 171. Id. at 1181. 
 172. Id. at 1181-82. 
 173. 964 P.2d 614, 615 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
722 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44:693 
information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining 
or communicating the information.174 
The Fluid Technology court found that information given “in the course of the 
defendant’s business, profession, or employment is sufficient indication that he 
has a pecuniary interest in it . . . .”175 
Still other courts have relied on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§302B in finding there is a duty of care to make admonitory disclosures in 
employment references.176  Section 302B imposes liability: 
[W]here the actor has brought into contact or association with the other a 
person whom the actor knows or should know to be peculiarly likely to 
commit intentional misconduct, under circumstances which afford a peculiar 
opportunity or temptation for such misconduct.177 
Although no Missouri court has yet imposed an affirmative duty on employers 
to provide reference information about an employee’s dangerous propensities, 
and several courts have in fact rejected such a theory,178 the mere possibility of 
liability continues to create a disincentive for employer’s to provide 
references.179 
III.  A CRITICAL LOOK AT MISSOURI’S SOLUTION 
When Missouri passed its law, it joined the ranks of at least thirty other 
states that provide some statutory immunity for employers providing 
references.180  Nevertheless, a close examination of the language and its 
 
 174. Id. at 616 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) (1977)). 
 175. Davis, 964 P.2d at 616 (relying on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) cmt. d 
(1977)). 
 176. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302B (1965). 
 177. Id.; Golden Spread Council, Inc. v. Akins, 926 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. 1996). 
 178. See Kiren Dosanjh, Annotation, Former Employer’s or Supervisor’s Tort Liability to 
Prospective Employer or Third Person for Misrepresentation or Nondisclosure in Employment 
Reference, 68 A.L.R.5th 1 (1999).  See also Grozdanich v. Leisure Hills Health Ctr., 48 F. Supp. 
885 (D. Minn. 1999). The court discussed, and then rejected, the possibility that Minnesota might 
recognize the tort of negligent representation.  See id. at 888-92.  The employee, who was 
allegedly sexually harassed by her supervisor, sued the supervisor’s former employer for issuing a 
favorable reference of the supervisor despite the former employer’s knowledge of instances of 
alleged sexual assault and harassment on the part of supervisor.  See id. at 886-87. 
 179. See Alex B. Long, Note, Addressing the Cloud Over Employee References: A Survey of 
Recently Enacted State Legislation, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 177, 187-88 (1997). 
 180. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.160 (Michie 1996); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1361 (West 
Supp. 1996); CAL. CIV. CODE § 74(c) (West 1992 & Supp. 1997); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-114 
(Supp. 1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.095 (West Supp. 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1-4 (Supp. 
1996); IDAHO CODE § 44-201 (Supp. 1996); 745 ILL. COMP.STAT. ANN. 46/10 (West Supp. 
1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-5-3-1 (Michie 1997); IOWA CODE ANN. § 91B.2 (West Supp. 1999); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-119a (Supp. 1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:291 (West Supp. 1997); 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 598 (West Supp. 1996); MD. CODE ANN., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-
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possible implications indicates that it contains several ambiguities that may 
detract from the law’s ability to encourage employers to abandon their “no 
comment” or neutral job reference policies. 
A. Who Receives Immunity Under the New Statute? 
An “employer” under the new Missouri statute includes “any individual, 
organization, partnership, political subdivision, corporation or other legal 
entity which has or had in the entity’s employ one or more individuals 
performing services for the entity.”181  As introduced, the new Missouri statute 
included protection for an employer’s agent responding to a reference request, 
but the language was deleted from the bill before its passage.182  This omission 
may create litigation regarding who is clothed with immunity to respond to a 
reference.183 
The United States Supreme Court has held that, if an agent is guilty of 
defamation, the principal is liable if the agent was apparently authorized to 
make the defamatory statement.184  This decision might limit litigation when a 
plaintiff attempts to hold an employer liable for the defamatory statements of 
its personnel department.185  It may do little, however, to discourage court 
battles regarding whether supervisory personnel, by virtue of their titles alone, 
manifest apparent authority to make defamatory statements or whether 
employers are liable for unauthorized statements made by non-supervisory 
employees under common-law agency principles.186 
 
423 (Supp. 1996); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.452 (West Supp. 1997); MO. ANN. STAT. § 
240.152 (West Supp. 2000); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.755 (1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-12-1 
(Michie Sup. 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.12 (1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-02-18 (Supp. 
1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.71 (Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
40, § 61 (West Supp. 1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.178 (1998); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-6.4-1 (Supp. 
1996); S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-65 (Law. Co-op Supp. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 60-4-12 
(Michie Supp. 1996); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-105 (Supp. 1996); H.B. 341, 76th Leg. (Tex. 
1999) (enacted) (to be codified at TEX. CODE ANN., ch. 103), UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-42-1 (Supp. 
1996); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.487 (West 1997); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-1-113 (Michie Supp. 
1996). 
 181. MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.1(1). 
 182. As introduced, the bill that would have extended the immunity to “any person delegated 
to act on the employer’s behalf.” H.B. 441 of 1/18/99, supra note 33.  According to the bill’s 
main sponsor, Representative Riback Wilson, this language was deleted because lobbyists for 
employees feared it created a gray area that might allow an employer to blame an underling for 
the content of a reference in an attempt to escape liability.  See id. 
 183. See Jennifer L. Aaron, Comment, The Tug-of-War with Employment Information: Does 
Louisiana Revised Statutes [sic] 23:291 Really Help Employers Stay Out of the Mud?, 58 LA. L. 
REV. 1131, 1150 & n.156 (1998). 
 184. See id. at 1150 & n.156 (citing American Soc’y of Mechanical Eng’rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel 
Co., 456 U.S. 556, 566 (1982)). 
 185. See Aaron, supra note 183, at 1150 n.156. 
 186. See id. at 1150  n.156. 
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The new statute could be amended to clarify who may respond to a request 
for a reference on the employer’s behalf while simultaneously maintaining an 
employer’s immunity under the law.187  By extending protection to the 
employer “and/or his expressly authorized designee,” as suggested by one legal 
commentator, the statute would be “more protective of the interests of the 
employee’s business reputation,” since it would remove unauthorized gossip 
and conjecture from the protection of the statute.188 
B. Who May Request Information 
To be protected under the new Missouri statute, an employer must respond 
only upon request from a “prospective employer.”189  A prospective employer 
includes any employer “to which an individual has made application or 
employment, either oral or written, or forwarded a resume or other 
correspondence expressing an interest in employment”190 or a person that the 
employer “reasonably believes to be a prospective employer.”191  Requiring a 
written request before statutory immunity attaches to a reference may shield 
employers from claims for negligent hiring.192  The written requests could 
 
 187. A number of state statutes that define the term “employer” within the statute specifically 
include an employer’s “agent” in the definition.  See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 291(C)(1); 
MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.1(1); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.755(3)(b); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
4113.71(A)(2); S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-65(A)(1). Although not specifically defining “employer” 
within the statute, at least six other states provide reference immunity for an employer’s agent 
who provides a reference.  See 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 46/10; IOWA CODE ANN. § 91b.2.1; 
GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1-4(b); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.12(c); N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-10-18(1); 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 60-4-12.  According to Mike Kaemmerer, who lobbied for the bill on 
behalf of the Missouri Merchants and Manufacturers Association, protection for an employer’s 
“agent” under the new law was not an issue that was discussed.  See Interview with Mike 
Keammerer, lobbyist for the Missouri Manufacturers Association, October 21, 1999 (on file with 
author).  However, it should be noted that the definition of “employer” in the new Missouri bill, 
which includes “political sudivision[s],” provides protection for a much broader spectrum of the 
work force than is covered under Missouri’s Service Letter Statute.  Compare MO. ANN. STAT. § 
290.152.1, with MO. REV. STAT. 290.140. 
 188. Aaron, supra note 183, at 1151.  Aaron also suggests that “[b]y limiting the immunity 
from liability to situations involving designees or authorized employees, the law would give 
employers an incentive to appoint and train designees, perhaps reducing the instances of 
defamation.”  Id. 
 189. MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.1(2). 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id.  This phrase did not appear in the original bill creating the statute.  See H.B. 441 of 
1/18/99, supra note 33.  According to one of the bill’s sponsors, Representative Riback Wilson, 
this phrase was added to protect employers who feared that people fishing for information might 
represent themselves as a prospective employer.  See id.  Representative Riback Wilson says that 
Missouri businesses wanted protection if they inadvertently released information to the wrong 
person.  See id. 
 192. See Swerdlow, supra note 149, at 1671-72. 
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serve as “evidence that the employer investigated the candidate’s fitness for the 
position before hiring.”193 
Restricting the statutory protection to responses made at the request of a 
prospective employer, fails to give statutory protection to employer responses 
made pursuant to a request from a current or former employee.194  There 
appears to be no real justification for limiting the new statutory immunity to 
requests for references from prospective employers since the key to the 
common law qualified privilege is that the information be divulged upon 
request, rather than volunteered.195 
Accordingly, the new statute could be amended so that its language mirrors 
the Service Letter Statute.196  Under the Service Letter Statute, an employee 
must send a request via certified mail and specifically identify the statute 
 
 193. Id. at 1671. 
 194. Nearly half of the states with shield laws provide protection to employers when 
responding to requests, verbal or written, from either a prospective employer or a current or 
former employee.  See ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.160; COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-114(3); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 768.095; IDAHO CODE § 44-201(2); IOWA CODE ANN. § 91B.2(1); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 291(A); MD. CODE ANN. § 5-423(a)(1); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.452.2; N.C. GEN 
STAT. § 1-539.12(a); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.71(B); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.178.1; R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 28-6.4-1(c); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-105; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.487(2).  At least five 
additional states provide some immunity from civil liability for employers providing references 
without a request for the information.  See GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1-4(b); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-5-
3-1(b); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 598; N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-02-18(2); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-1-
113(a). 
 195. Pursuant to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 595 (1977), whether a reference is 
made in response to a request is one factor in determining whether the publication is privileged: 
(1) An occasion makes a publication conditionally privileged if the circumstances induce 
a correct or reasonable belief that 
  (a) there is information that affects a sufficiently important interest of the recipient or 
a third person, and 
  (b) the recipient is one to whom the publisher is under legal duty to publish the 
defamatory matter or is a person to whom its publication is otherwise within the generally 
accepted standards of decent conduct. 
(2) In determining whether a publication is within generally accepted standards of decent 
conduct it is an important factor that 
  (a) the publication is made in response to a request rather than volunteered by the 
publisher or 
(b) a family or other relationship exists between the parties. 
Id. (emphasis added).  See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 596 (1977) (“An occasion 
makes a publication conditionally privileged if the circumstances lead any one of several persons 
having a common interest in a particular subject matter correctly or reasonably to believe that 
there is information that another sharing the common interest is entitled to know.”). 
 196. See MO. REV. STAT. § 290.140.1 (“Whenever any employee . . . requests in writing by 
certified mail . . . with specific reference to the statute . . . it shall be the duty of the 
superintendent or manager . . . to issue to such employee, within forty-five days after receipt of 
such request, a letter . . .  .”) 
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before the duty to respond arises on the part of the employer.197  A request for 
a service letter made by regular mail, rather than certified mail, does not give 
rise to a duty on the part of the employer to respond, even if the employer in 
fact receives the request.198 
C. How to Respond 
To come within the safe harbor of Missouri’s reference immunity statute, 
an employer must respond “in writing” to a request concerning a current or 
former employee.199  Requiring a written response under reference immunity 
statutes, rather than extending protection to verbal recommendations, affords 
additional protection to employers.200  A written response may protect 
employers against claims for negligent referral because an employer “would 
have direct evidence regarding the extent of its knowledge about the position 
for which the applicant was being considered, and thus, the extent to which the 
plaintiff’s harm was foreseeable.”201  A written response also creates additional 
protection for employees because they will have a written copy of any 
defamatory reference to use as evidence in a lawsuit challenging its accuracy.  
Proscribing a written response also insures that employees know exactly what 
information is being shared with their prospective employers, thereby 
circumventing the so-called “wink and nod” approach.202  This approach may 
allow employers who purport to give only “no comment” or neutral job 
references to convey a message about the employee through voice tone or 
inflection.203 
D. What Information May or Must be Provided 
Under Missouri’s reference immunity statute, qualified immunity attaches 
when an employer discloses “the nature and character of service rendered by 
such employee to such employer and the duration thereof,” and “truly state[s] 
for what cause, if any, such employee was discharged or voluntarily quit.”204  
 
 197. See MO. REV. STAT. § 290.140.1. 
 198. See Bartareau v. Executive Bus. Prods., Inc., 846 S.W.2d 248, 250 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993). 
 199. MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.2(1). 
 200. See Swerdlow, supra note 149, at 1671-72. 
 201. Id. at 1672. 
 202. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text (discussing the “wink and nod” approach). 
 203. Id. 
 204. MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.2(2)-(3).  This is the same language as is used in the 
Missouri Service Letter Statute. See MO. REV. STAT. § 290.140.1.  As originally introduced, the 
new law would have amended the Service Letter Statute by further defining the information to be 
included in a service letter.  See H.B. 441 of 1/18/99, supra note 33.  Thus, the Service Letter 
Statute would have been amended to conform to the newly proposed sections addressing 
employer liability for issuing written references.  See id.  The proposed language would have 
required that the letter include “(1) Date and duration of employment; (2) Most recent pay level; 
(3) Most recent job description and duties; (4) Wage history for the most recent two years or the 
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A statutory definition of the information an employer may disclose may be a 
key ingredient in the protection of employees from publication of immaterial 
defamatory information.205  It may also encourage employers to include 
pertinent information to try and insulate themselves from liability for punitive 
damages for providing a reference.206  As currently written, however, the 
definition of the required response under the statute is ambiguous.207 
The statute merely states that an employer “may” respond to a request for a 
reference in writing and lists two categories of information that an employer 
“may” divulge under the statute.208  Although the two categories of 
information listed are joined by the word “and,”209 there is nothing in the 
statute’s language requiring an employer to include both categories of 
information in a response.210  To address this ambiguity, the statute could be 
amended to require that employers wishing to insulate themselves from 
liability for punitive damages when providing a reference be required to 
include certain information.  One of the major purposes of the act is to aid 
Missouri employers in making better-informed hiring decisions.211  As the 
statute reads now, a court could conclude that an employer is protected even if 
he chooses to include only one category of information specified in the 
statute.212 
Moreover, at least one Missouri court has held that the common law 
qualified privilege protects a wide variety of information that may be included 
 
length of employment, whichever is shorter; and (5) Whether the employee was discharged or 
voluntarily  quit  the  service and the reason for the separation.”  Id.  According to one of the 
measure’s sponsors, Representative Riback Wilson, there was considerable opposition to 
amending the Service Letter Statute from lobbyists for larger employers who feared that making a 
change in the contents of letters required under the statute would increase costs and confuse those 
businesses and human resource managers already accustomed to conforming with the Service 
Letter Statute’s dictates.  See Riback Wilson interviews, supra note 33.  Representative Riback 
Wilson says that following a public hearing, the bill was amended so that it no longer amended 
the Service Letter Statute to conform to the new law, but rather, made the new law conform to the 
Service Letter Statute.  See id; House Comm. Sub. for H.R. 441, 90th Leg. 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 
1999) version dated March 4, 1999 available in 1999 MO H.B. 441 (Westlaw, MO-BILLS 
database). 
 205. See Oliver, supra note 3, at 692 (asserting that a specific definition of job performance 
would discourage plaintiffs from arguing that references fall outside the scope of the definition 
and would discourage employers from including irrelevant information). 
 206. See id. 
 207. See generally MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.2(1). 
 208. Id. § 290.152.2(2)-(3) (These categories include the nature, character and duration of 
service rendered, and the true cause, if any, of the employee’s voluntary or involuntary separation 
from employment). 
 209. Id. 
 210. See generally MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152. 
 211. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text (discussion of statute’s purposes). 
 212. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.2. 
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in a reference.213  The Missouri Court of Appeals held that so long as the 
communication is made in good faith, “the person making the statement is not 
limited to facts that are within his personal knowledge, but may, and should, 
pass on to his inquirer all relevant information that has come to him, regardless 
of whether he believes it to be true or not.”214  It is doubtful the Missouri 
General Assembly intended to narrow the common law qualified privilege 
since one of the stated purposes of the new law is to encourage the free-flow of 
information between employers.215 
Furthermore, the legislature chose to adopt the language in the Service 
Letter Statute that has spawned the majority of litigation under that statute 
relating to reference claims.216  Accordingly, the new statute should be 
amended to clarify and expand the information an employer may share and still 
be protected by the statutory qualified immunity.217 
The Louisiana reference immunity statute, for example, defines “job 
performance” to include, but not limited to, “attendance, attitude, awards, 
demotions, duties, efforts, evaluations, knowledge, skills, promotions, and 
disciplinary actions.”218  A recent scholarly critique of the Louisiana law 
indicates that three years after its passage no cases had yet been decided 
applying the statute.219  Thus, no empirical evidence exists to suggest that the 
Louisiana definition of “job performance” will be a portion of the statute that is 
frequently litigated.  Clearly, the Louisiana statute gives employers much more 
guidance regarding the information to be included in a job reference than the 
new Missouri law does. 
In summary, at a minimum, the new statute could be amended to clarify 
that an employer must include both categories of information to gain the 
 
 213. See Cash v. Empire Gas Corp., 547 S.W.2d 830 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976). 
 214. Id. at 833. 
 215. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text (reporting the purposes of the act as 
viewed by the sponsor of the new bill). 
 216. See supra notes 55-89 and accompanying text (discussing litigation under the Service 
Letter Statute). 
 217. Most states do not explicitly provide immunity for the disclosure of the reasons for an 
employee’s separation from employment.  See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09-65.160; 745 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 46/10; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.71(B); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-105.  At least 
four other states with shield laws provide complete immunity to employers for providing certain 
basic information about employees, such as wage rates and dates of employment, but provide 
only qualified immunity if an employer discloses the reasons for an employees’ separation from 
employment.  See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-119a(b)-(d).  It appears that only two states 
specifically provide for some of type of employer immunity if an employer discloses an illegal or 
wrongful act, however, neither of these states require that an employee actually be convicted of a 
crime before immunity attaches to the disclosure.  See GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1-4(b); NEV. REV. 
STAT. § 41-755(1)(c). 
 218. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:291. 
 219. See Aaron, supra note 183, at 1150. 
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statutory protection.  Additionally, the information protected under the statute 
could be expanded to give employers more guidance when they attempt, in 
good faith, to comply with the law. 
E. Who Receives a Copy? 
Lobbyists for Missouri employee groups worked hard to ensure that 
employees would have a right to obtain a copy of any response protected by 
the new statute.220  The Missouri statute requires employers to send a copy of 
any response made pursuant to the statute to the affected employee at the 
employee’s last known address.221  The new law also allows an employee to 
request a copy of any letter provided under the statute “for up to one year 
following the date of such letter.”222  The provision of the statute addressing 
available damages, however, is silent as to any penalty an employer may face 
for failing to provide a copy of the reference to the employee.223 
It is important to guarantee that employees are aware of the contents of any 
reference letter sent to prospective employers.  To assure employees receive 
this benefit, the statute could be amended to allow an award of damages 
against an employer who fails to mail a copy of any response to the 
employee’s last known address or provide a copy upon request of the 
employee.224  This amendment would create no additional burden for 
employers while ensuring an employee is aware of the information being 
shared with his or her prospective employer. 
F. When is the Statutory Privilege Forfeited? 
Missouri’s statute creates an implied assumption that employers are 
replying in good faith when responding to reference requests.225  To overcome 
the good faith presumption, an employee must prove that the response “was 
false and made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard for 
whether such response was true or false.”226  This standard is nearly identical 
 
 220. See Riback Wilson interviews, supra note 33. 
 221. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.3. 
 222. Id.  Originally, the bill proposing the new law provided only for a copy to be sent to the 
affected employee at his or her last known address.  See H.B. 441 of 1/18/99, supra note 33.  
According to Representative Riback Wilson, one of the bill’s sponsors, the provision was added 
in consideration of employees who did not want anyone to know where they lived, in particular, 
victims of domestic violence.  See Riback Wilson interviews, supra note 33. 
 223. See MO REV. STAT. § 290.152.5. 
 224. See Riback Wilson interviews, supra note 33. 
 225. See MO. REV. STAT. § 290.152.4.  The vast majority of states explicitly state that an 
employer is presumed to be acting in good faith.  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1361; 
IDAHO CODE § 44-201; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-6.4-1. 
 226. MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.4. As introduced, the proposal would have required a 
plaintiff to prove that the response “was false and made with knowledge that it was false or with 
reckless disregard for whether such response was true or false at a time when the employer had 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
730 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44:693 
to that needed to overcome the qualified privilege that attaches to employee 
references under Missouri common law.227  Legal commentators who have 
called for a uniform standard to overcome the qualified privilege in reference 
cases seem to agree that the standard chosen by Missouri legislators is an 
appropriate one.228 
G. What Burden of Proof is Required? 
The Missouri statute does not define the standard of proof required to 
overcome an employer’s privilege for providing a reference.229  Legal 
commentators appear to agree that the standard of proof should be defined 
within the statute.230  These scholars also seem to agree that the more stringent 
“clear and convincing” standard rather than the “preponderance of the 
evidence” standard, should be used when defining the burden of proof 
necessary to overcome the qualified immunity that attaches to letters of 
reference.231  The more burdensome clear and convincing standard may make 
 
serious doubt whether such response was true.”  H.B.441 of 1/18/99, supra note 33.  However, 
the underlined portion of the standard was deleted prior to the bill’s passage.  According to the 
law’s co-sponsor, Representative Riback Wilson, this language was deleted at the request of 
employer groups who felt that the omission of this language would offer them better protection 
from liability under the statute.  See Riback Wilson interviews, supra note 33. 
 227. See Snodgrass v. Headco Indus., Inc., 630 S.W.2d at 154-55 (citing MAI 23.10(2)).  The 
standard also mirrors the standard necessary to overcome the qualified privilege in a public-figure 
defamation action, as well as the standard necessary to overcome the qualified privilege to a 
defamation action under the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS.  Compare New York Times v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964), defining “actual malice” as knowledge that the published 
statement was “false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not,” with 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 600 (1977), regarding “abuse” of the qualified privilege 
which may be shown if false and defamatory matter is published when the publisher (a) knows 
the matter to be false, or (b) acts in reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity”, id., with the new 
Missouri statutory standard for overcoming the qualified privilege which requires a showing that 
the response be “false and made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard for 
whether such response was true or false.”  MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.4. 
 228. See Oliver, supra note 3, at 756-58; Saxton, supra note 19, at 83-85; Adler & Pierce, 
supra note 3, at 1458-59. 
 229. At least eight other states do not define an employee’s burden of proof.  See, e.g., CAL. 
CIV. CODE ANN. § 47(c); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 61. The majority of states require a 
showing by a preponderance of the evidence to overcome an employer’s statutory qualified 
immunity.  See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-113(3); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 
423.452(2).  A minority of jurisdictions requires the stricter clear and convincing standard to 
overcome the employer’s presumption of good faith.  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.095; 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-42-1(3). 
 230. See Oliver, supra note 3, at 756-58. 
 231. See id. at 756-58; Saxton, supra note 19, at 110; Adler & Pierce, supra note 3, at 1456 
(“[W]e recommend this higher standard to signal society’s view that liability ought to attach in 
employment-reference cases only in compelling circumstances.”). 
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employers more comfortable including detailed information, both positive and 
negative, in an employee reference.232 
It should be noted, however, that these legal commentators are not 
addressing statutes, like the new Missouri statute, wherein employees are 
completely disabled from receiving punitive damages if an employer abuses 
the statutory qualified immunity.233  To strike a better balance between an 
employer’s protection under the Missouri statute, and the availability of a 
remedy to a prevailing plaintiff, the preponderance standard seems better 
suited to the Missouri statutory scheme.  Plaintiffs are already foreclosed from 
a punitive damage remedy under the new law, and the strict “clear and 
convincing standard” might make it too difficult for the truly aggrieved 
employee to obtain any relief at all. 
H. Unique Features of the Missouri Law 
The new Missouri law contains several unique features that do not appear 
in other states’ shield laws.  First, Missouri’s statute is the only one that 
attempts to limit any successful plaintiff under the statute to an award of 
compensatory damages.  Second, the Missouri statute attempts to address an 
employer’s liability when the prospective employer receives the requested 
reference after the applicant has already been hired.  These features are 
designed to make the Missouri statute more effective than other states’ statutes 
in encouraging employers to share reference information. 
1. The Unavailability of Punitive Damages 
Missouri appears to be the only state that specifically addresses the 
available damages under its reference immunity statute.234  An employer who 
violates the section of the statute proscribing the allowable contents of a 
reference “shall be liable for compensatory damages but not punitive 
damages.”235  However, the new Missouri statute places the bar to a punitive 
damage award in a subsection that is distinct from the subsection giving 
employers qualified immunity for providing a reference.236  A narrow reading 
of the statute might actually allow for an award of punitive damages if an 
employee can show that the statutory qualified privilege has been abused. 
To understand this ambiguity, it may be helpful to parse the new statute.  
In pertinent part, subsection 2 of the new statute provides: 
 
 232. See Oliver, supra note 3, at 757. 
 233. See id. 
 234. MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.5. 
 235. Id. 
 236. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.4-5. 
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2. An employer may: 
(1) Respond in writing to a written request concerning a current or former 
employee from an entity or person which the employer reasonably believes to 
be a prospective employer of such employee; and 
(2) Disclose the nature and character of service rendered by such employee to 
such employer and the duration thereof: and 
(3) Truly state for what cause, if any, such employee was discharged or 
voluntarily quit such service.237 
While subsection 5 of the new statute reads: 
5. Any employer who violates the provisions of subsection 2 of this section 
shall be liable for compensatory damages but not punitive damages.238 
It is difficult to conceive of a damage award that would punish employers who 
failed to comply with a voluntary requirement. 
Missouri lawmakers also chose to place the immunity for an employer in a 
separate subsection stating: 
4. For purposes of this section, an employer shall be immune from civil 
liability for any response made pursuant to this section or for any 
consequences of such response, unless such response was false and made with 
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard for whether such 
response was true or false.239 
This portion of the statute appears merely to clothe employment references 
with the same qualified privilege given to references under Missouri’s 
common law.240  Under Missouri’s common law, if a defamation plaintiff 
meets the burden outlined in subsection 4, the plaintiff may be entitled to seek 
punitive damages in addition to compensatory damages.241  Under this 
interpretation, the new Missouri statute does not protect employers from an 
award of punitive damages, even though limiting an employers liability was 
one of the purposes of the bill.242 
For example, in a reference Employer A states that an employee was 
terminated for insubordination.  Employer A fails to include, however, the 
nature, character or duration of the employee’s service to the employer.  A 
court could then find that the employer failed to comply with subsection 2 of 
the statute.  Thus, the employee would not be entitled to punitive damages 
 
 237. MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.2 (emphasis added). 
 238. Id. § 290.152.5. 
 239. Id. § 290.152.4. 
 240. See supra note 227 (comparing the standard necessary to overcome the qualified 
privilege under the common law with that required by the new statute). 
 241. See supra note 113 (discussing the availability of punitive damages in a common law 
defamation action). 
 242. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text (discussing the new statute’s purposes). 
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under subsection 5 of the statute, which provides that no punitive damages are 
available for a violation of subsection 2 of the statute. 
Nevertheless, the Court could find that in addition to violating subsection 2 
of the statute, the employer’s response was made with reckless disregard for 
whether the response was true or not, thereby violating subsection 4 of the 
statute. Subsection 4 of the statute does not limit an employee’s available 
remedies and merely outlines the standard for overcoming the statutory 
qualified immunity.  This standard mirrors the standard for overcoming the 
qualified privilege that attaches to employment references under Missouri 
common law.  Therefore, the court could apply common law defamation 
principles and conclude that the plaintiff is entitled to seek punitive damages. 
Thus, the statute may actually both prohibit and enable a plaintiff to seek 
punitive damages under the same section.243  Clearly, such a result was not one 
that the legislature intended when the statute was drafted.  To address this 
ambiguity, the new Missouri statute could be amended to clearly prohibit an 
award of punitive damages against an employer who responds to a reference 
request. 
2. Protection after Hiring Has Occurred 
The Missouri statute appears unique in providing that qualified immunity 
applies “regardless of whether the employee becomes employed by the 
prospective employer prior to receipt of the former employer’s written 
response.”244  This provision would extend an employer’s statutory qualified 
immunity to situations in which an employee is hired by an employer prior to 
receipt of a written response made pursuant to the statute, but then loses the job 
after the response is received by his new employer.245  Presumably, this would 
absolve a former employer from liability based, for example, on a claim of 
tortious interference with economic advantage.246 
IV.  A PROPOSAL FOR FUTURE CONSIDERATION 
The state legislature should consider (1) amending the Missouri employer 
reference immunity statute to require an employer to respond to a proper 
request from a current or former employee or prospective employer; (2) 
placing a limited duty to warn on employers when responding to requests from 
 
 243. See supra note 113 (discussing availability of punitive damages under a common law 
defamation claim in Missouri). 
 244. MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.2(3). 
 245. See Aaron, supra note 183, at 1152-53 (suggesting Louisiana’s employer immunity 
statute might not cover a situation where an employee has already been hired when the reference 
is requested); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:291 (West Supp. 1997). 
 246. See supra note 45 (discussing the tort of intentional interference with economic 
advantage). 
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prospective employers in certain occupations; (3) allowing an award of 
attorneys’ fees and costs to a prevailing party; and (4) repealing the Missouri 
Service Letter Statute. 247 
A. Make the Shield Law Mandatory 
Despite the passage of voluntary “shield laws” in two-thirds of the states, 
and proposals from a variety of legal commentators attempting to encourage 
the free flow of information, employers maintain a “name, rank, and serial 
number” mentality.248  Perhaps the time has come for a mandatory shield law 
that (1) rewards employees who deserve a good recommendation; (2) attempts 
to weed-out those employees who may be dangerous to their co-workers or the 
general public; and (3) protects employers from large damage awards. 
During the 1999 legislative session, the state’s large employers lobbied 
against a mandatory shield law because they feared it would create another 
opportunity for litigating employee reference claims.249  It would appear, 
however, that the only way to avoid litigation under the statute that was 
enacted would be for employers to choose simply not to use it. 
Making the employer immunity statute mandatory will create another 
avenue for employees to challenge allegedly defamatory references.  
Nevertheless, in return for the creation of this new statutory cause of action 
employers would receive a number of benefits.  Employers will enjoy 
immunity from an award of punitive damages even if the reference is found to 
violate the statute.  Requiring employers to give a more complete reference 
will, in turn, increase the information they receive about an applicant.  Thus, 
employers will be able to make better-informed hiring decisions.  The ability to 
make more informed hiring decisions should allow employers to choose the 
most qualified applicant, leading to decreased turn over and training costs.  
Better-informed hiring decisions might also create a corresponding decrease in 
an employer’s potential liability for negligent hiring because employers will 
have sufficient information to avoid hiring a potentially dangerous employee. 
The burden created by a mandatory reference immunity statute would 
initially fall disproportionately on employers.250  Missouri employers would be 
required to educate themselves and their human resource personnel on properly 
 
 247. It is doubtful that such a proposal could garner any support in Missouri’s current 
political climate.  See Riback Wilson interviews, supra note 33 (indicating that a statute imposing 
a duty on an employer to respond to a reference request would not pass in the current political 
environment because lobbyists for large businesses feared it would create another opportunity for 
litigation).  See also infra notes 296-313 and accompanying text (outlining statutory language that 
might be employed to enact the proposals contained in this Comment). 
 248. See supra notes 2-25 and accompanying text. 
 249. See supra note 204 (discussing employer concerns over amended the Service Letter 
Statute). 
 250. See id. 
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responding to a request issued under the statute.  However, the statute would 
also give employers specific statutory guidance regarding the type of 
information to be included in any mandatory response.  Additionally, absent a 
proper request from an employee or employer, no duty to respond would arise 
on the part of the employer.251 
One of the main arguments against amending the current Service Letter 
Statute, rather than creating a new employer reference immunity statute, came 
from employers already required to respond under the Service Letter Statute.252  
These employers feared they would be required to expend additional time and 
money to retrain their human resource personnel.253  Although this argument 
eventually won the day and the lawmakers did not amend the Service Letter 
Statute, the fact that employers already have policies in place to ensure 
compliance with the Service Letter Statute supports the contention that 
employers are capable of instituting policies and procedures enabling them to 
comply with the new law.  Thus, it can be argued that complying with a 
mandatory reference immunity statute would require only an initial 
expenditure to establish proper policies and procedures but would not impose 
an undue burden on employers. 
Finally, it is conceded that if employers are required to respond to a proper 
request made under the statute, they may no longer be able to avoid liability 
under a negligent misrepresentation theory by simply choosing to remain 
silent.254  Few courts, however, have embraced this theory in the employment 
context in the years following the Muroc decision.255  Moreover, Missouri 
corporate employers may not remain silent in the face of a proper request 
under the Service Letter Statute.256  Still, it appears no Missouri court has held 
an employer liable for negligent misrepresentation for failing to include 
negative information in a service letter. 
Nevertheless, to address the possibility that Missouri courts might imply a 
“duty to warn” from an employer’s required response under a mandatory 
reference statute, this Comment suggests that the legislature strictly limit any 
such duty.  First, any statute creating a duty to warn should include a specific 
definition of the information that must be included in a reference.  Second, the 
 
 251. See supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text (discussing similar requirement under 
Missouri Service Letter Statute). 
 252. See Riback Wilson interviews, supra note 33. 
 253. See id. 
 254. See Davis v. Board of County Comm’rs, 987 P.2d 1172, 1181-83 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999) 
(concluding that expanding liability for negligent misrepresentation into the employment 
reference context will not “have a chilling effect on employer willingness to give references, 
whether good or bad . . . .”). 
 255. See supra notes 150-79 and accompanying text (discussing the tort of negligent 
misrepresentation or referral). 
 256. See MO. REV. STAT. § 290.140.1. 
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duty to include this information should be further narrowed to apply only to 
requests for references from employers whose employees pose a high risk of 
injury to third persons.257 
B. Theoretical Support for Imposing a Very Limited Duty to Warn 
Our tort law system has been very reluctant to impose an affirmative duty 
on individuals to warn or protect other people.258  Under the common law, an 
employer has no duty to respond to a reference request from a prospective 
employer and disclose an employee’s unfavorable traits, even if those 
characteristics may suggest a propensity for danger.259  However, calls for 
imposing a duty to warn have been sounded by legal commentators for nearly a 
decade.260 
Janet Swerdlow, one of the earliest authors to propose that a duty to warn 
be placed on employers, based her proposal on the seminal case of Tarasoff v. 
Regents of the University of California.261  In Tarasoff, a psychologist told 
campus police to detain a student because the student had confided to the 
therapist that he intended to kill an unnamed, but readily identifiable female 
student.262  Although the patient was detained for a short while, neither the 
female student nor her family was warned of the possible imminent danger.263  
 
 257. See supra notes 150-79 (discussing negligent referral cause of action). 
 258. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1977) (“The fact that an actor realizes or 
should realize that action on his part is necessary for another’s aid or protection does not of itself 
impose upon him a duty to take such action.”). 
 259. See Saxton, supra note 19, at 66. 
 260. See Swerdlow, supra note 149, at 1670 (“To protect society from potential dangers while 
not unduly exposing employees to a risk of being defamed, it is necessary to impose a duty to 
warn.”); Saxton, supra note 19, at 91 (“This section proposes that [S]tates should . . . impose a 
limited duty on employers to respond to reference inquiries . . . .  In appropriate circumstances, an 
employer’s breach of this duty could cause the employer to be liable in tort for injuries caused to 
third parties by the employer’s former employee, if the employer withheld reference information 
that might have prevented the injuries.”); Buckhalter, supra note 148, at 310 (“The law can best 
encourage the disclosure of reference information by imposing an affirmative duty of disclosure 
on employers.”); Oliver, supra note 3, at 755 (“[T]o encourage employers to abandon their 
policies . . . state legislatures [should] adopt ‘good faith’ reference statutes that also place a 
narrow duty to disclose information regarding a departing employee’s or former employee’s 
violent or dangerous behavior.”).  But see Adler & Pierce, supra note 3, at 1447 (“If employers 
are to have a general duty to warn of a former employee’s dangerous propensities - - and we 
remain open but unconvinced on that point - - we prefer that they duty be to alter public 
authorities about the danger, if it is sufficiently grave, clear, and imminent, rather than to notify 
the prospective employers.”); J. Hoult Verkerke, Legal Regulation of Employment Reference 
Practices, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 115 (1998) (“[D]isclosure obligations might well produce more 
harm than good.”). 
 261. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976). 
 262. See id. at 341. 
 263. See id. 
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Shortly thereafter, the patient killed the female student.264  The victim’s parents 
sued the Regents of the University of California based on their “failure to warn 
of a dangerous patient.”265 
The Tarasoff court noted that the common law has created an exception to 
the general “no duty rule” in cases where a “special relationship” exists 
between the defendant and the dangerous person or his or her foreseeable 
victim.266  The court found that the bond between a psychotherapist and a 
patient created a “special relationship” that warranted placing an affirmative 
duty to warn on the psychotherapist for the benefit of third persons.267  
Likewise, commentators have compared the employer-employee relationship 
to that of a therapist and a patient “because prospective new employers, their 
employees and members of the general public may be able to avoid 
unnecessary exposure to potential harm if former employers are required to 
disclose information that would warn a prospective new employer of an 
applicant’s dangerous or criminal tendencies.”268  Additionally, legal scholars 
have noted that “an employer may acquire special knowledge of an 
individual’s dangerous or criminal tendencies in the course of the employer-
employee relationship.”269 
Commentators also suggest that the “special relationship” between a 
former employer and a prospective employer supports imposing a limited duty 
to warn.270  They assert that the “dependency” of the prospective employer on 
the former employer is “analogous to the ‘dependencies’ giving rise to duties 
 
 264. See id. 
 265. Id. at 341. 
 266. 551 P.2d at 343. 
 267. Id. The Tarasoff court also addressed the fact that the duty to warn might erode the 
patient’s faith in the psychotherapist-patient privilege but concluded “that the public policy 
favoring protection of the confidential character of patient-psychotherapist communications must 
yield to the extent to which disclosure is essential to avert danger to others.  The protective 
privilege ends where the public peril begins.”  Id.  at 347. 
 268. Saxton, supra note 19, at 94. 
 269. Id. at 94. 
 270. None of the commentators who have proposed the limited duty to warn have gone so far 
as to require employers to volunteer information about an employee’s dangerous propensities: 
While employers could conceivably be required to act as “volunteers” in this fashion, 
administrative and practical concerns suggest that it would not be fair or reasonable to 
require them to do so; moreover, the prospect of liability for “negligent hiring” should 
already be strongly encouraging prospective employers to contact their applicants’ former 
employers for reference information. 
Saxton, supra note 19, at 96.  However, at least one author has suggested protecting those 
employers that see a “moral duty” to volunteer such information.  “Balancing the interests 
involved, the requirement that information be requested is imprudent.  Statements made by a 
former employer compelled by a moral duty to divulge are protected by the jurisprudential 
qualified immunity if the information is given in good faith.”  Aaron, supra note 183, at 1152. 
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of protection under the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS.”271  For example, 
comment b to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A indicates that 
“[t]he law appears . . . to be working slowly toward recognition of the duty to 
aid or protect in any relation of dependence or of mutual dependence.”272  
Janet Swerdlow asserts that “[b]ecause it is foreseeable that certain information 
regarding the job applicant’s suitability for employment would not be known 
by anyone other than the applicant’s former employer, [the prospective 
employer] is dependent upon [the former employer] to provide this valuable 
information.”273 
It should be noted that when Swerdlow wrote her article, the California 
Supreme Court had not yet decided Muroc.274  Thus, current supporters of an 
employer’s limited duty to warn base the need for such a duty on cases like 
Muroc.275  By extending liability only to employers who voluntarily respond to 
a job reference request, Muroc encourages employers to retain their “no 
comment” policies.276  Commentators also highlight the increase in workplace 
violence as a basis for imposing a duty to warn on employers.277 
 
 271. See Saxton, supra note 19, at 95 (footnote omitted). Under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 314A (1977), the following are examples of “dependency” relationships and their 
corresponding duties: 
(1) A common carrier is under a duty to its passengers to take reasonable action 
(a) to protect them against unreasonable risk of physical harm, and 
(b) to give them first aid after it knows or has reason to know that they are ill or 
injured, and to care for them until they can be cared for by others. 
(2) An innkeeper is under a similar duty to his guests. 
(3) A possessor of land who holds it open to the public is under a similar duty to members 
of the public who enter in response to his invitation. 
(4) One who is required by law to take or who voluntarily takes the custody of another 
under circumstances such as to deprive the other of his normal opportunities for 
protection is under a similar duty to the other. 
Id.  
 272. RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A cmt. b (1965). 
 273. Swerdlow, supra note 149, at 1661. 
 274. See Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 929 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1997); supra notes 
151-64 and accompanying text (examining the Muroc decision). 
 275. See generally Oliver, supra note 3, at 737-48 (discussing recent case law leading to her 
conclusion that a duty to warn should be imposed on employer’s responding to references). 
 276. See, e.g., Oliver, supra note 3, at 753-54; Bradley Saxton, Employment Reference in 
California after Randi W. v. Muroc Joint United School District: A Proposal for Legislation To 
Promote Responsible Employment Reference Practices, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 240 
(1997).  See also Davis v. Board of County Comm’rs, 987 P.2d 1172, 1179 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999) 
(while recognizing the tort of negligent misrepresentation in the employment referral context, 
noting that to avoid liability the defendants “could have remained silent in response to requests 
for information . . . .”). 
 277. See Oliver, supra note 3, at 691-92; Markita D. Cooper, Beyond Name, Rank and Serial 
Number: “No Comment” Job Reference Polices [sic], Violent Employees and the Need for 
Disclosure-Shield Legislation, 5 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 287, 292-98 (1998). 
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J. Bradley Buckhalter, a recent advocate of imposing a limited duty to 
warn on employers, asserts that holding employers liable for failing to disclose 
an employee’s dangerous propensities would comport with general tort 
doctrine by giving “effect to both the fault and foreseeability principle . . . .”278  
By withholding information about an employee whom the employer knows 
with reasonable certainty will likely present a continuing risk of harm to 
others, Buckhalter asserts that the employer “chooses to engage in conduct that 
ultimately result in harm to innocent victims.”279  Accordingly, the choice to 
withhold such information “places the employer within the realm of legal 
fault,” warranting departure from the “no duty to act” rule.280  Buckhalter 
further suggests that an employer owes a duty to former employee’s potential 
victims because “the employer knows what the victim does not: that a former 
employee poses a risk of harm.”281 
It is clear that theoretical support abounds among legal commentators for 
imposing a duty to warn on employers to protect innocent third parties.  
Nevertheless, most of these commentators agree that this duty should be 
strictly limited. 
1. Limiting the Duty to Warn 
Several limitations on the proposed duty to warn would be prudent.282  
First, in his assessment of this issue, Professor Bradley Saxton suggests that it 
would be necessary to limit the types of information about former employees 
that would require disclosure.283  The required disclosure should be limited to 
ensure that only information that appears reasonably necessary to warn the 
prospective employer of the employee’s “propensity to engage in violent or 
dangerous conduct posing a threat of physical injury to others.”284  Although 
this standard may seem workable in hindsight, as it was in Muroc,285 how 
likely is it that the average employer is prepared to judge, in advance, whether 
an employee or former employee has such a “propensity”?  Rather than forcing 
employers to speculate as to a given employee’s “propensity” for violence, 
specific categories of behavior can be defined in the statute that are indicative 
of an employee’s tendency to engage in harmful conduct in the workplace.286  
 
 278. See Buckhalter, supra note 148, at 294. 
 279. Id. at 294. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. at 295. 
 282. See, e.g., Saxton, supra note 19, at 96-99; Long, supra note 179, at 214-219 (advocating 
against a blanket duty to warn on all employers). 
 283. See Saxton, supra note 19, at 96-97, 109. 
 284. Id. 
 285. Muroc, 929 P.2d at 589. 
 286. See Cooper, supra note 277: 
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As an additional safeguard for employees who fear one minor outburst at the 
office will harm their chances for future employment, the duty to include 
admonitory information in a reference can be limited to certain occupations in 
which an employee’s contact with third persons creates a high risk of potential 
harm.287 
Missouri law also supports imposing a duty to warn when an applicant 
seeks a position that carries a high risk of potential harm to others.  One 
Missouri statute provides that a criminal records check be performed, with the 
employee’s consent, for certain “providers,” including day care homes and 
centers; employers of nurses; public or private “youth services” agencies, such 
as schools; and employment settings in which an applicant would come “in 
contact with minors, patients or residents.”288  Another Missouri statute 
requires people seeking employment with certain state agencies, including 
“any state agency which provides programs, care or treatment for or which 
exercises supervision over minors,” undergo a criminal records check.289 
To conclude, rather than rely on the traditional tort law principles that 
impose a duty to warn based on a “special relationship,” the Missouri statute 
could provide clearer and more specific requirements for a duty to warn by: (1) 
carefully defining the type of admonitory information an employer is required 
to include in a reference, and (2) limiting the reach of the duty to warn to 
employment settings in which there is a high risk of harm to third parties. 
C. Costs and Attorney’s Fees 
The Missouri statute currently does not provide for an award of costs and 
attorneys’ fees to a party who prevails in a suit brought under the statute.  The 
 
The proposed affirmative duty to disclose workplace violence in job references is limited.  
It does not require disclosure of displays of anger, loss of temper, or frustration on the job.  
Nor would the duty require employers to disclose incidents with purely economic 
consequences, such as theft, embezzlement, or similar offenses.  The statute requires 
disclosure of violent conduct that physically injured or posed a significant risk of physical 
injury to employees, customers, or clients in the workplace. 
Id. at 326 (footnotes omitted).  These categories of behavior can be defined using recent court 
decisions holding employers liable for the foreseeable acts of violent employees as well as police 
profiles developed to assist employers in identifying employees with a propensity for violence in 
the workplace.  See, e.g., supra notes 150-79 and accompanying text (discussing recent cases in 
which employers have been found liable for failing to disclose an employee’s harmful conduct to 
a prospective employer); MISSOURI CAPITOL POLICE, MO. DEPT. OF PUB. SAFETY, VIOLENCE IN 
THE WORKPLACE, at 3-4 (visited Feb. 22, 2000) <http://www.dps.state.mo.use/dps/mcp.study/wr 
kvio.html> [hereinafter MISSOURI CAPITOL POLICE]. 
 287. See Long, supra note 179, at 217 (suggesting restricting the duty to warn to “situations in 
which a high risk of danger exists or in which the consequences of dangerous employees are 
likely to severe”). 
 288. MO. REV. STAT. § 43.540 (1994). 
 289. MO. REV. STAT. § 43.543 (1994). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2000] THE NEW MISSOURI EMPLOYER IMMUNITY STATUTE 741 
shield laws of at least two other states contain a section addressing attorneys’ 
fees and costs.290  Additionally, the model statutes of several legal 
commentators have proposed fee-shifting provisions.291  The fee-shifting rule 
is designed to encourage employers to adopt more open reference policies by 
abating fears that they will be forced to defend even reasonable and defensible 
reference practices.292  Moreover, a fee-shifting provision creates incentives for 
both plaintiffs and defendants to settle any litigation early if they find their 
position to be legally indefensible.293  Finally, the proposed fee-shifting rule 
might more fully compensate an aggrieved employee under the statute who is 
effectively prohibited from an award of punitive damages.294 
D. Repeal the Missouri Service Letter Statute 
A mandatory reference immunity statute would eliminate the need for 
Missouri’s Service Letter Statute which has created a somewhat confusing 
body of law regarding the availability of punitive damages, despite the 1982 
amendment intended to limit such awards.295  Those employees covered by the 
Service Letter Statute, which entitles them to request a reference, would not 
lose this benefit.  Employees formerly covered by the Service Letter Statute 
would be included within the coverage of the mandatory reference immunity 
statute, which also would entitle employees to request a reference and to 
receive a copy of any reference made pursuant to the statute. 
E. Proposed Statute 
The following proposed statute combines the suggestions for reform of the 
new Missouri statute in this Comment with those of several legal 
commentators who have recently written on the subject of employment 
references.  This proposal is forwarded solely for discussion and is merely 
intended to reflect the continuing need to attempt to balance the interests of 
employees, employers and the general public in creating a safe and effective 
work environment: 
 
 290. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1361(I) (a court “shall award court costs, attorneys fees 
and other related expenses to any party that prevails in any civil proceeding in which a violation 
of this section is alleged”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.71(C) (Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1997) 
(allowing for an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and court costs of the defendant if there is a 
jury verdict in favor of the defendant and “the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the lawsuit constituted frivolous conduct”). 
 291. See, e.g., Long, supra note 179, at 220-21; Saxton, supra note 19, at 52, 110-12. 
 292. See Saxton, supra note 19, at 104. 
 293. See id. 
 294. See id. 
 295. See supra notes 55-89 (discussing Missouri Service Letter Statute). 
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1.  As used in this section, the following terms shall mean: 
(1) “Employer” means any individual, organization, partnership, political 
subdivision, corporation or other legal entity, and/or such entity’s 
expressly authorized designee, which has or had in the entity’s employ one 
or more individuals performing services for the entity within this state;296 
(2) “Employee” means any person, paid or unpaid, performing services for 
an employer, as defined in this section;297 
(3) “Prospective employer” means any employer, as defined in this 
section, to which an individual has made application for employment, 
either oral or written, or forwarded a resume or other correspondence 
expressing an interest in employment;298 
(4) “Job performance” includes, but is not limited to, attendance, awards, 
dates of service, duties, level of pay, promotions, skills, and reasons for 
separation from employment;299 
(5) “Harmful or Violent Conduct” includes, but is not limited to, battery, 
assault, threats of violence, physical fighting, possession of weapons, 
physical harassment, child molestation and sexual harassment;300 
(6) “Workplace” means at the employers place of business or at a site 
wherein the employee is acting at the direction of the employer or upon the 
employer’s behalf.301 
2.  Any former or current employee or prospective employer may request in 
writing by certified mail addressed to the manager, owner, supervisor or 
registered agent of such employer, with specific reference to this statute and, if 
applicable, with specific reference to subsection 4 of this section, a letter 
setting forth information pertaining to the job performance of the employee.302 
3.  Any employer who receives a proper request made pursuant to subsection 2 
of this section from a current or former employee, prospective employer, or 
from an entity or person the employer reasonably believes to be a prospective 
employer shall, within thirty (30) working days of receipt of such letter, 
respond in writing setting forth information pertaining to the job performance 
of such employee.  Any employer who responds by letter pursuant to this 
 
 296. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.1; Aaron, supra note 183, at 1151; supra notes 181-86 
and accompanying text. 
 297. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.1. 
 298. See id. 
 299. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 423.452; MO. REV. STAT. § 290.140.1; supra notes 204-19 
and accompanying text. 
 300. See Cooper, supra note 277, at 337 app. B; MISSOURI CAPITOL POLICE, supra note 286, 
at 3-4; supra notes 282-87 and accompanying text. 
 301. See Cooper, supra note 277, at 337 app. B. 
 302. See MO. REV. STAT. § 290.140.1. 
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subsection shall be immune from liability in a civil action by the employee or 
any other person for any consequences of the disclosure.  This immunity shall 
not apply if:303 
(1) it can be shown by preponderance of the evidence that such response 
was false and made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless 
disregard for whether such response was true or false.304 
4.  Any employer who receives a proper request made pursuant to subsection 2 
of this section from a current or former employee, prospective employer, or 
from an entity or person the employer reasonably believes to be a prospective 
employer, and the current or former employee engaged in harmful or violent 
conduct in the workplace shall, within thirty (30) working days of receipt of 
such letter, respond in writing setting forth such information. Such information 
must be disclosed if the prospective employer employs personnel in one of the 
following categories:305 
(1) school personnel; 
(2)  those who in the course of their duties have regular contact with 
minors; 
(3) police personnel; 
(4) department of corrections personnel; 
(5) nursing home personnel; 
(6) health care providers; 
(7) day care providers; or 
(8) common carrier personnel.306 
Any employer who responds by letter pursuant to this subsection shall be 
immune from liability in a civil action by the employee or any other person for 
any consequences of the disclosure.  This immunity shall not apply if:307 
(1) it can be shown by a preponderance of the evidence that such response 
was false and made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless 
disregard for whether such response was true or false.308 
 
 303. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.2, -.4; MO. REV. STAT. § 290.140.1. 
 304. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.4; supra notes 229-33, 282-87 and accompanying text. 
 305. See MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 290.152.2, 290.140; Long, supra note 179, at 220-21; supra 
notes 282-87 and accompanying text. 
 306. See Long, supra note 179, at 220-21; supra notes 282-87 and accompanying text. 
 307. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.2-.4. 
 308. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.2. 
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5. Any employer found not to be immune pursuant to subsection 3 or 
subsection 4 of this section shall be liable for compensatory, but not punitive 
damages.309 
6.  The provisions of this section shall apply regardless of whether the 
employee becomes employed by the prospective employer prior to receipt of 
the employer’s response.310 
7.  The employer shall send a copy of any letter provided pursuant to 
subsection 3 or subsection 4 of this section, requested by a prospective 
employer, to the current or former employee at the employee’s last known 
address.  The current or former employee may request from the employer a 
copy of the letter provided pursuant to subsection 3 or subsection 4 of this 
section for up to one year following the date of the letter.311 
8.  An employer who fails to issue any letter properly requested pursuant to 
subsection 2 of this section or fails to issue any copy of such letter properly 
requested pursuant to subsection 7 of this section shall be liable for nominal, 
compensatory and punitive damages.312 
9.  A court, in its discretion costs, may award attorneys’ fees and other related 
expenses to any party that prevails in any civil proceeding in which a violation 
of this section is alleged.313 
V. CONCLUSION 
The passage of the new Missouri reference immunity statute will be largely 
meaningless if both employers and employees are unaware of it.314  Despite the 
nearly one hundred year history of the Service Letter Statute in Missouri, at 
least one Missouri lobbyist believes very few employers and employees are 
actually aware of its existence.315  It is likely the new Missouri statute will 
share this fate unless there is an educational campaign to inform employers and 
employees of the statute’s passage.316  As employers learn more about the 
protection afforded by the new law, their anxieties about providing reference 
 
 309. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.5; supra notes 234-42 and accompanying text. 
 310. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.2. 
 311. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.152.3. 
 312. See MO. REV. STAT. 290.140.2; supra notes 220-24 and accompanying text. 
 313. See TEX. CODE  ANN. ch. 103; supra notes 290-94 and accompanying text. 
 314. See Riback Wilson interviews, supra note 33.  Representative Riback Wilson indicated 
she has already had several invitations from employer groups to speak about the new statute.  See 
id. 
 315. Telephone Interview with St. Louis County Associate Circuit Judge Mary Schroeder, 
who prior to assuming the bench lobbied for the new Missouri law on behalf of the Missouri 
Association of Trial Attorneys (Oct. 21, 1999). 
 316. Id. 
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information may lessen.317  Alternatively, an employee would have a written 
reference to share with prospective employers that accurately reflects the 
employee’s job performance. 
The new Missouri reference immunity statute is a step toward opening the 
channels of communication between employers regarding employee 
references.  The statute attempts to protect employee interests by requiring that 
employees receive a copy of any response made pursuant to the statute.  
However, it remains to be seen how Missouri employers, employees, attorneys 
and courts will answer some of the questions raised by the statute.  What effect 
will the new statute have on current law?  Will courts read the statute to 
expand an employer’s common-law qualified immunity?  Will courts simply 
rely on traditional principles in deciding cases under the new statute making its 
passage largely unnecessary?  Will the courts give the statute preclusive effect 
as to other available avenues of redress?  Will the new statute merely create 
another opportunity for litigating employment references in Missouri?  Will 
Missouri courts imply a duty to warn prospective employers about employees 
with dangerous propensities? 
The unique features of the new Missouri reference immunity statute show 
careful deliberation by lawmakers and lobbyists.  Among the most important 
features is the attempt to limit the availability of punitive damages in an 
employee reference claim.  No other state has tried this approach.  Yet the 
Missouri law places a very high burden on plaintiffs seeking to challenge false, 
misleading or defamatory information contained in a reference, while limiting 
their available remedies.  The new statute attempts to ensure employees will 
receive a copy of any reference made pursuant to the statute, but provides no 
remedy for a violation of this provision of the law. 
Only time will tell if Missouri employers are still damned if they do, and 
damned if they don’t. 
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